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The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11
CARL TOBIAS*
The 1983 revision of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rule I I" or the "Rule") proved to be the most controversial amendment in
the long history of the Federal Rules. Many federal judges inconsistently
interpreted the provision's language and inconsistently applied the Rule. The
1983 version fostered much costly, unwarranted satellite litigation over its
phrasing and the magnitude of sanctions that courts imposed while increasing
incivility among lawyers. Rule 11 motions were filed and granted against civil
rights plaintiffs more frequently than any other class of litigant, and numerous
judges vigorously enforced the provision against the plaintiffs, levying large
sanctions on them. Most of these complications arose from the Rule as
applied, not as written.
These difficulties led numerous members of the legal profession and some
federal judges to urge amendment of the 1983 version. Now that the lengthy
revision process has concluded and the new Rule has become effective, it is
important to analyze that provision and to afford suggestions for minimizing
the problems which attended implementation of the 1983 Rule. This Article
undertakes that effort.
Part I examines implementation of the 1983 version. Part II then traces the
amendment process that resulted in promulgation of the new Rule, identifying
and employing the most reliable sources of the Rule revisers' intent. Finally,
Part III evaluates the new Rule, particularly those aspects which promise to
be most controversial or difficult to implement. Part III also provides
suggestions for rectifying or ameliorating the complications which may attend
the implementation of the new Rule by offering guidance for courts which
will be applying the new Rule and for lawyers and litigants who must comply
with it.'
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan, Jeff Renz, and Peggy
Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and
the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. I have written two articles that examine Rule It's amendment. The first evaluated and
recommended improvements in a 1991 preliminary draft proposal. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule
11, 46 U. MIAM L. REv. 855 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Reconsidering]. The second article analyzed
and suggested improvements in the draft that became the new Rule. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights
Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IowA L. REv. 1775 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias,
Proposed]. Although the Rule's revisers incorporated some of the first article's recommendations in the
draft which became the new Rule, they adopted none of the second article's suggestions. This Article,
therefore, provides suggestions for facilitating the new Rule's implementation.
Because the 1983 revision of Rule 11 disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers the most, I
emphasize such plaintiffs and lawyers throughout this Article. Insofar as the new Rule does not improve
upon the 1983 version, it would disadvantage all litigants and attorneys, but particularly those who bring
civil rights actions. Much about the Rule's impacts on civil rights plaintiffs applies to all resource-poor
litigants. These plaintiffs, therefore, are a surrogate for them. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights
Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89) [hereinafter Tobias, Rule 11]; see generally Eric
K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value ofAccessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 341 (1990).
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I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1983 AMENDMENT OF RULE 11
Rule 1l 's implementation following its significant amendment in 1983
warrants comparatively brief treatment here, because that background has been
thoroughly canvassed elsewhere. 2 The United States Supreme Court promul-
gated revised Rule 11 as an important component of an integrated package of
rules which the Court intended to expand attorneys' duties in, and courts'
control over, civil litigation, especially during the pretrial phase.' The 1983
modification mandated that lawyers and litigants perform reasonable prefiling
inquiries into the facts and the law while certifying that their papers were
factually well grounded and legally warranted. The 1983 version of Rule 11
also required that judges impose sanctions on attorneys and parties who failed
to comply with these responsibilities.4
During the first half-decade after Congress and the Court adopted the 1983
revision, courts differed over numerous issues which were integral to the
amendment's effectuation, inconsistently construing and enforcing the new
version. 5 The 1983 alteration of Rule 11 correspondingly fostered much
expensive, unnecessary satellite litigation over, for example, its terminology
and the kind and size of sanctions levied.6 Throughout this five-year time
frame, Rule 11 motions were filed, and sanctions imposed, against civil rights
plaintiffs more often than any other category of civil litigants,7 while many
judges stringently applied the Rule against these plaintiffs or imposed large
sanctions on them when they contravened Rule 11. Many civil rights
2. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall et al., Tire Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943,
946-49 (1992); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 855, 858-64; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule I1:
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478-92 (1991). The original 1938
Rule, which fell into disuse because of a reluctance on the part of attorneys to invoke it and a reluctance
on the part of judges to impose sanctions, had not been amended prior to 1983. See generally D.
Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems With Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976) (reviewing Rule I l's pre-1975 history).
3. See ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Carl
Tobias, Public Law Litigation and tire F deral Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 291-
92 (1989).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68.
5. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118
F.R.D. 189, 207 (1988).
6. Compare Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that there exists
no continuing duty to comply with Rule 11 on individual papers after the initial filing of those papers)
with Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1386-87 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (finding that there is a continuing
duty), af'd, Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 959 (1991). See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.)
(involving satellite litigation regarding sanctions imposed), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see
Burbank, supra note 5, at 1930-31; Tobias, Rule ll.. supra note 1, at 514.
7. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems
in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 1340 (1986); Vairo,
supra note 5, at 200-01.
8. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987) (providing
an example of vigorous enforcement), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (providing an example of vigorous enforcement); Avirgan v. Hull,
705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (involving a $1,000,000 sanction), affd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992).
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plaintiffs and their counsel possess relatively limited money and time, which
can make them risk averse, and a number of judges, lawyers, and writers have
contended that the way in which courts implemented the 1983 version of Rule
11 had a chilling effect on these parties and attorneys. 9
Most of the difficulties in implementing Rule 11 can be ascribed to judicial
uncertainty about the principal purpose of the 1983 amendment. The Advisory
Committee Note which attended the 1983 revision intimated that the primary
objective was to deter litigation abuse.'" A 1985 study of the early imple-
mentation of the 1983 version of Rule 11, which was conducted under the
auspices of the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), however, suggested that the
revisers' goals were to punish offenders, to compensate those harmed by the
violation, and to deter future abuse." In implementing the 1983 revision,
courts, by failing to concentrate on Rule I I's deterrent objective and by
making attorney fees the overwhelming sanction of choice,' 2 afforded parties
enormous financial incentives to invoke the Rule and led numerous lawyers
and parties to consider it a fee-shifting mechanism. 3
These developments correspondingly generated a gigantic increase in filings
of Rule 11 motions, creating an entirely new type of civil litigation. Courts
published nearly seven hundred Rule 11 opinions in the initial three and one-
half years after the 1983 amendment 14 and issued hundreds of additional
unpublished determinations. 5 Indeed, there were more than three thousand
reported Rule 11 cases by the end of 1990.16
A considerable amount of the early commentary on the revised Rule was
favorable. For instance, Professor Arthur Miller, the Advisory Committee
reporter, authored a FJC report that generally lauded the 1983 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amendment to Rule 11.17
Judge William Schwarzer of the Northern District of California wrote a 1984
article which praised the modified Rule and urged federal judges to enforce
9. See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1327, 1340; Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 1, at 495-98, 503-06;
Vairo, supra note 5, at 200-01; cf. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CIVIL RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE I 1 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND RELATED RULES AS AMENDED IN 1983, 131 F.RD. 344, 347 (1990) [hereinafter CALL FOR
COMMENTS] (stating that there may be disagreement as to whether the 1983 version of Rule 11 had
actually chilled such plaintiffs).
10. See FED. R. CrV. P. 11 (1983 revision) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 198,
199.
11. See SAUL M. KASSIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE I 1 SANCTIONS
(1985). The Federal Judicial Center is the research arm of the federal courts.
12. ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES § lB,
at 9 (1991) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]; Nelken, supra note 7, at 1333.
13. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 479-80. But cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,409
(1990) ("Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute...
14. Vairo, supra note 5, at 199.
15. See Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 1, at 485-86; Tobias, supra note 3, at 301.
16. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 480 (citing NEW YORK BAR ASS'N, COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (Nov. 1990)).
17. See MILLER, supra note 3.
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it vigorously.'" Many courts relied upon and cited Professor Miller's report
and Judge Schwarzer's article when writing Rule 11 opinions in the half-
decade following the 1983 change.' 9 Some observers, however, were critical
of the revision. For instance, Professor Stephen Burbank primarily challenged
the Supreme Court's authority to adopt the amendment, 20 while Professor
Edward Cavanagh cogently questioned how the revision would operate in
practice."
It was only after the judiciary had been implementing the 1983 provision
for several years that some of the major difficulties mentioned above became
clear, and commentators began addressing those problems. During 1986,
Professor Melissa Nelken wrote a very important article in which. she claimed
that courts were seriously and improperly overemphasizing the Rule's
compensatory purpose, that judges chose attorney fee shifting as the sanction
in the vast majority of cases, and that the Rule's implementation was
disadvantaging and probably chilling the enthusiasm of civil rights plain-
tiffs. 22 Two years later, Professor Georgene Vairo authored an equally
influential paper in which she made similar assertions. 23 That same year,
even Judge Schwarzer expressed some reservations, relating primarily to
satellite litigation and the Rule's invocation for compensatory purposes.24
Near the end of 1988, the FJC completed a Rule 11 study which confirmed
some of these assertions and reservations, such as the amount of Rule 11
activity, but disagreed with others, such as the contention that the Rule had
a chilling effect on civil rights plaintiffs. 25 During 1989, the Third Circuit
Task Force on Rule 11 issued its report stating that judges were inconsistently
enforcing the 1983 Rule, that the provision was engendering satellite
litigation, and that its application could be disadvantaging resource-poor
litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs.26
Ironically, at about the same time that criticism of Rule 11 was growing, the
lower federal courts began improving its implementation. For instance, judges
began construing and enforcing Rule 11 with greater consistency, and the
quantity of satellite litigation declined.27 Courts and lawyers apparently
18. William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181 (1985).
19. See, e.g., Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 512, 519 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Holley v. Guiffrida, 112
F.R.D. 172, 174 (D.D.C. 1986).
20. Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HoFsTRA L. REV. 997 (1983).
21. Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 (1986).
22. See Nelken, supra note 7.
23. See Vairo, supra note 5.
24. William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988).
25. See THOMAS WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 67-8 1,
157-68 (1988).
26. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 13-24, 60-61, 68-72 (1989).
27. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 110-22
(1991); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication
of Rule 11 By Harmonizing It With Pre- Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 266-67
(1991).
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employed Rule 11 against civil rights plaintiffs less frequently," and judges
evidenced an increasing concern for the needs of these litigants in determining
whether they had violated the provision and in levying sanctions.29
The Supreme Court's Rule 11 jurisprudence unfortunately did not reflect the
improvements witnessed in the federal circuit and district courts.30 In a series
of four opinions,3 the Court construed Rule 11 literally and in ways that
disregarded the complications of both satellite litigation and chilling. This
literal interpretation, emphasizing stringent deterrence, discouraged plaintiffs
from pursuing novel legal theories.3 2 It also encouraged satellite litigation by
permitting the pursuit of sanctions after a plaintiff had voluntarily withdrawn
a complaint.33 Moreover, literal construction allowed and could have
encouraged Rule 1 l's invocation as a fee-shifting measure.34
Despite the apparent improvements in implementation by the federal circuit
and district courts, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules decided to begin
assessing the possibility of amending the 1983 version of Rule 11 during
1989.3' The next Part traces the amendment process, emphasizing those
sources which seem to evidence the Rule revisers' intent and which appear
most reliable in ascertaining that intent.
28. This assertion is premised on an informal survey of reported opinions, and unreported opinions
available on computerized services, since January 1, 1991. See generally Tobias, Reconsidering, supra
note I, at 861 n.22.
29. See, e.g., Foster v. Mydas Assoc., 943 F.2d 139, 145-46 (1st Cir. 1991); Kraemer v. Grant
County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990); Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn.
1990).
30. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
3 1. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992); Business Guides v. Chromatic Communica-
tions Enters., 498 U.S. 533 (1991); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
32. In all four opinions cited supra at note 31, the Court interpreted Rule II literally and
emphasized strict deterrence. The opinion in Willy discouraged plaintiffs because the Court held that a
federal district court could impose Rule 11 sanctions on an employment discrimination plaintiff even
when that court was later found to lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf Vairo, supra note 2, at 487-90
(including analysis of how the opinions in Pavelic and Cooter discouraged plaintiffs from pursuing
novel legal theories).
33. Willy, 112 S.Ct. 1076; Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. 384.
34. In upholding Rule I I against a Rules Enabling Act challenge, the Business Guides Court
ignored the reality that attorney fees had been the sanction of choice and thus retained that incentive
for invoking the Rule. Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 551-54.
35. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 854 (1991). The Advisory Committee is a twelve-member entity
consisting ofjudges, law professors, and attorneys, which Congress has authorized to study the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and to formulate proposals for change as warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073
(1988). See also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for
Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1507, 1509-11 (1987) (reviewing congressional involvement in
the federal civil rulemaking process); Mullenix, supra, at 797 n.2 (describing the composition of the
Advisory Committee and providing citations to other useful authority); Laurens Walker, A Comprehen-
sive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 455, 464-69 (1993) (reviewing the
history and powers of the Advisory Committee).
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II. THE RULE REVISION PROCESS
A. The Initial Advisory Committee Decision
Many developments, including those discussed in Part I of this Article,
apparently coalesced in 1989 and convinced the Advisory Committee to begin
examining the prospect of revising the 1983 version of Rule 11. Judge Sam
C. Pointer, Jr., the Advisory Committee's chairman during most of the
revision process, observed that "[t]he Committee had received various
requests, formal and informal, for further amendment or abrogation of [the
1983 version and was] ... aware of several studies of the rule undertaken by
various individuals, bar associations, and courts" but was uncertain whether
it should propose any modifications and, if so, what kind of modifications
should be made.36
The Advisory Committee's resolve to explore the possibility of amendment
apparently crystallized at its November, 1989 session." The Committee
examined the 1983 revision for half a day during that session. Two public
interest attorneys contended that the 1983 version was disproportionately
affecting civil rights plaintiffs and other public interest litigants and
encouraged the Committee to undertake additional study of the Rule's impact
on these parties." Judge John Grady, then Advisory Committee chairman,
urged these lawyers to conduct their own empirical analysis of Rule 1 l's
operation for the purpose of educating the Committee, while the Committee
agreed to commission another FJC study.3 9
At the November, 1989 session, Judge Grady also named a subcommittee
consisting of Professor Paul Carrington, the Committee's reporter, Magistrate
Judge Wayne Brazil of the Northern District of California, and Thomas
Willging, Deputy Research Director of the FJC, who were to designate
significant issues relating to Rule 1 's operation and to plan an empirical
study.4" In December, Willging assembled a document which examined the
state of existing empirical work on Rule 11, concentrating on those issues
which Professor Carrington had designated as important." When the FJC
Research Division received the subcommittee's suggestions, Willging and
other division personnel began implementing an empirical assessment of
Rule 11.42
36. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(Attachment B to Letter to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, chairman, Standing Committee, from Hon. Sam C.
Pointer, Jr., chairman, Advisory Committee 2-5 (May 1, 1992)), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 522-25
(1993) [hereinafter 1992 Pointer Letter]. Judge Pointer was chairman from early 1991 until mid-1993.
37. In the remainder of this Part, I substantially rely on Mullenix', supra note 35, at 854, and Tobias,
Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 861-62.
38. See Mullenix, supra note 35, at 854; Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 861-62.
39. See Mullenix, supra note 35, at 854.
40. Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 861-62 n.28.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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During January of 1990, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI), then
the chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee responsible for oversight of
rules revisions, conveyed to Judge Grady and the subcommittee his concern
about Rule I l's effect on civil rights plaintiffs and sought information about
the Advisory Committee's proposed study of Rule 11." In February, Judge
Grady responded to Representative Kastenmeier by suggesting that the 1983
version required additional evaluation."
B. FJC Preliminary Report
Before the Advisory Committee met in the spring of 1991, the FJC
concluded its compilation and preliminary evaluation of data on Rule 11; the
Committee had employed computerized docket information from five federal
districts and responses to questionnaires circulated to every federal district
judge.45 The data gleaned from the five courts indicated that, on the average,
civil rights plaintiffs were no more likely to be found in violation of the Rule
than parties who file other kinds of suits in which there is a high rate of Rule
11 activity. 46 The FJC also determined that attorney fees were the sanction
of choice, even though numerous nonpecuniary options were also available to
courts.4 7
The FJC detected two major themes in the judicial responses to the survey.
Approximately four-fifths of the respondents thought that Rule 11 had a
positive impact on civil litigation, that the Rule's benefits warranted the
judicial time expended on its implementation, and that the 1983 version
should be retained .4' A comparable number of judges considered groundless
litigation to be a minor problem and believed that prompt rulings on motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment, Rule 16 pretrial conferences, and
informal warnings were more effective than Rule II for treating such
cases.49 Half of the respondents thought that "Rule 11 exacerbate[d]
contentious behavior between counsel. 5 °
The information in the FJC's preliminary report may have been important
to Rule lI's revision, especially insofar as the Rule revisers depended on it
when amending the Rule, although such reliance is impossible to verify. For
43. Telephone Interview with Charles Geyh, professor of law, Widener University, former counsel,
U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and
the Administration of Justice (Sept. 13, 1993); see also Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 862.
44. Letter from Judge John F. Grady to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Feb. 9, 1990) (copy on file
with author); see also Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 862.
45. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11: JUDGES SURVEY AND
FIELD STUDY PRELIMINARY REPORTS (1991). Because the FJC made no changes relevant to this Article
in compiling its final report, cited supra at note 12, I rely on the preliminary report in this Part. See
Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note I, at 864; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
46. FJC REPORT, supra note 12, § IC, at 1-8.
47. Id. § IB, at 9.
48. Id. § IA, at 1.
49. Id. § IA, at 1-2.
50. Id. § IA, at 2. These are the survey results most relevant to the issues treated in this Article,
although the FJC Report includes much additional information.
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instance, the finding in the five-court study that Rule 11 did not dispropor-
tionately affect civil rights plaintiffs may indicate that the Rule revisers
considered the Rule's other detrimental impacts, such as satellite litigation,
sufficient to warrant an amendment proposal. 51 The study's finding that
attorney fees were the sanction of choice may have correspondingly
influenced the Rule revisers' determination to amend the Rule in ways that
would substantially reduce such awards. 2
Moreover, the similar percentage of judges who believed that Rule 11
should be retained in its 1983 form, that groundless lawsuits were a minor
difficulty, and that the 1983 Rule was relatively ineffective in treating such
litigation apparently reflected judicial ambivalence about the Rule. This
ambivalence and the Rule revisers' decision to propose an amendment to Rule
11, despite the finding that the 1983 version did not disproportionately affect
civil rights plaintiffs, may suggest that certain revisers and judges had
concluded that Rule 11 had achieved all that could reasonably be expected.
Apparently, these individuals felt their efforts would be better spent on
preventing discovery abuse, which many judges had come to believe was the
most important problem confronting the courts.53
C. The Call for Comments and Public Responses
In the summer of 1990, the growing criticism of Rule 11 apparently
prompted the Advisory Committee to announce publicly that it was reconsid-
ering Rule I1." The Committee published a Call for Comments, which
solicited written public responses to ten questions regarding the provision's
functioning that were due in November; the Call for Comments also
announced that the Committee would hold a hearing on the issue in February
of 1991." The Call for Comments included questions regarding whether Rule
11 had encouraged lawyers to "stop and think" before filing papers, whether
the benefits of that behavior outweighed the costs in terms of satellite
litigation, and whether the Rule had "been administered unfairly to any
particular group of lawyers or parties." 56 The Committee also stated that it
would evaluate all of this public input and the results of the FJC's
5 1. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note I, at 864-65.
52. See also infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., COMMrrTEE ON DISCOVERY, N.Y. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON DISCOVERY UNDER RULE
26(b)(1), reprinted in 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579; Ralph K. Winter, In
Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992). The revisers and judges may have also
concluded that Rule 1 I's disadvantages outweighed its benefits or that the expenditure of federal judicial
resources, especially for Rule 11 appeals, was not cost effective.
54. See CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 9, at 344; see also Mullenix, supra note 35, at 854;
Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
55. CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 9, at 345. The controversial character of the proposal to
amend Rule I 1 prompted the Committee to invert the ordinary sequence of soliciting public comment
after developing a proposal.
56. See id. at 346-47.
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examination of Rule 11 in making its determination of whether to propose an
amendmeAt of Rule 11 during its spring 1991 meeting.57
Approximately 125 persons and organizations responded in writing to the
Advisory Committee's Call for Comments, and the vast majority criticized the
1983 version and its implementation.58 The major criticisms were that the
Rule promoted too much expensive satellite litigation, that courts inconsis-
tently applied Rule 11, that the Rule's invocation detrimentally and dispropor-
tionately affected civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel, and that the Rule
fostered incivility among attorneys.
The Advisory Committee invited sixteen experts to testify at the public
hearing it held during its meeting in February of 1991 in New Orleans. 9
These witnesses consisted of three federal judges, nine bar members who
testified on behalf of certain groups such as the American Bar Association
Litigation Section and the American College of Trial Lawyers, and three law
professors.60 In selecting these witnesses, the Committee deliberately chose
a disproportionate number of Rule 11 critics, because the Committee was
principally interested in guaranteeing that it fully comprehended the different
amendment proposals.6 The critics' testimonies resembled the responses to
the Call for Comments; for example, the critics cited the costly satellite
litigation that Rule 11 engendered and the Rule's adverse effects on civil
rights plaintiffs.6" The Advisory Committee participated in wide-ranging
dialogue with the sixteen experts, emphasizing those queries that it had
included in the Call for Comments. 3
After the hearing, the Advisory Committee informally agreed that an
amendment to the 1983 version of Rule 11 was warranted and asked that the
FJC refine some dimensions of its preliminary assessment, particularly those
regarding Rule I l's application in civil rights actions.' Upon considering
the written and oral public input and the results of the FJC's preliminary
study, the Committee decided that the widespread criticism of the 1983
version had some merit, although the Committee thought that such criticism
was often exaggerated or based on flawed assumptions.6 ' The Committee
also believed that the amendment's purpose-to require that parties stop and
57. See id. at 345; see also Mullenix, supra note 35, at 854.
58. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 862-63; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93. The public
responses are on file at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in Washington D.C.
59. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 863; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
60. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 492 n.100.
61. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, INTERIM REPORT ON RULE 11, at 2 (1991) [hereinafter
INTERIM REPORT].
62. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 863; Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
63. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 492-93.
64. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 863.
65. See COMMrITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (Attachment to Letter to Hon. Robert E. Keeton,
chairman, Standing Committee, from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., chairman, Advisory Committee (June
13, 1991)), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Pointer Letter]; see also 1992
Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523.
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think before filing papers-remained appropriate and warranted retention. The
Advisory Committee also concluded that case law had resolved many of the
complications which Rule 11 had earlier posed.66 Nevertheless, the Commit-
tee found support for five important ideas:
(1) Rule 11, in conjunction with other rules, has tended to impact plaintiffs
more frequently and severely than defendants; (2) it occasionally has
created problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal contentions
or which needs discovery from other persons to determine if the party's
belief about the facts can be supported with evidence; (3) it has too rarely
been enforced through nonmonetary sanctions, with cost-shifting having
become the normative sanction; (4) it provides little incentive, and perhaps
a disincentive, for a party to abandon positions after determining they are
no longer supportable in fact or law; and (5) it sometimes has produced
unfortunate conflicts between attorney and client, and exacerbated
contentious behavior between counsel. 7
After the Advisory Committee had reached these conclusions and informally
decided that Rule 11 should again be amended, Judge Pointer and Professor
Carrington undertook principal responsibility for developing and drafting the
proposed modifications of the Rule for the Advisory Committee to consider
at its meeting in May of 1991.8 Judge Pointer and Professor Carrington
drafted a proposal which was intended to increase the Rule's fairness and
efficacy in deterring lawyers and parties from presenting and maintaining
frivolous positions while simultaneously decreasing the Rule's invocation. 69
D. The Advisory Committee's Interim Report and Preliminary
Draft of the Proposed Amendment
The Advisory Committee incorporated several of the issues discussed in Part
II.C in the findings of an Interim Report issued during April of 1992.70 The
most important component of the Interim Report was the Committee's
decision that there had been adequate experience with the 1983 version,
especially given its intense criticism, to warrant consideration of amendment
of Rule 11.7 It concomitantly determined that those criticisms were
sufficiently meritorious to support examination of particular suggestions for
modification.72
66. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64; see also 1992 Pointer
Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523.
67. 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64-65; see also 1992 Pointer
Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523 ("In addition, although the great majority of
Rule II motions have not been granted, the time spent by litigants and the courts in dealing with such
motions has not been insignificant.").
68. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 863-64.
69. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 65.
70. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 61.
71. Id. at 2; see generally Carl Tobias, Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223 (1991)
(asserting that there had been adequate experience with the 1983 version of the Rule to warrant
consideration of its amendment). But see Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule
11, 130 F.R.D. 479 (1990).
72. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 61, at 2.
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The Interim Report included a number of significant preliminary observa-
tions relating to the ten questions posed by the Call for Comments.73 For
instance, the Committee admonished that Rule 11 should not be considered as
the major vehicle for deterring groundless lawsuits; stated that Rule 11
motions exacerbate contentious conduct; found that judges differ substantially
in their enforcement of the Rule; and expressed concern that financial
sanctions for Rule 11 violations had become the norm.74 The Interim Report
also observed that Rule 11 sanctions had been levied more often upon
plaintiffs in certain types of cases and had a stronger effect upon some
groups, although it found insufficient evidence that the provision was being
employed unfairly in civil rights cases or that it had a chilling effect on civil
rights litigants.75
Before the Advisory Committee considered the proposal for amending the
1983 Rule drafted by Judge Pointer and Professor Carrington, Elizabeth
Wiggins and Thomas Willging, two researchers who had primary responsi-
bility for conducting the FJC's preliminary assessment, reported on the
additional work that they had undertaken at the Committee's request. 76 The
FJC's attempts to refine its earlier analysis yielded few new results. For
example, Willging reported that judges had imposed relatively few Rule 11
sanctions on civil rights plaintiffs who were represented by counsel in the five
districts studied and that the litigation in which judges found that Rule 11 had
been violated rarely "presented good faith arguments for changes in the
law. 7
7
The FJC researchers' efforts to document the amount of Rule 11 activity
essentially confirmed the work of other evaluators. For instance, Wiggins and
Willging discovered 835 reported district court and 346 reported appellate
court opinions applying Rule 11 between 1984 and 1989,78 while they
suggested that reported determinations probably comprised only one to ten
percent of the total court consideration of Rule 11 motions.79
Willging also distributed and explained to the Advisory Committee the
preliminary results of a Rule 11 study conducted under the auspices of the
American Judicature Society ("AJS"). 0 He observed that the evaluation of
Rule 11 activity in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits over a one-year
period included the "most systematic data to date on attorneys' experiences
with Rule 11 in their daily practices [and] promised to be an informative
final report.""1 The AJS had published its "Preliminary Report" in July of
73. See id. at 6-15.
74. See id. at 6-11.
75. See id. at 6-7.
76. See supra text accompanying note 64.
77. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 864.
78. Id. at 865; see also Vairo, supra note 5, at 199 (finding nearly 700 reported opinions between
1983 and 1987).
79. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 865; see also BURBANK, supra note 26, at 59
(suggesting that only 10% of all Rule I 1 decisions appear in the federal reporter system).
80. HERBERT KRITZER ET AL., RULE 11 STUDY: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1991).
81. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 865 n.53.
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1991. The Report included a number of tentative conclusions analogous to the
FJC's findings but warned that the AJS could not reach more conclusive
determinations until it had refined the material which had been gathered.82
That admonition ultimately proved to be prescient. For instance, the AJS
Preliminary Report found that Rule 11 had posed greater difficulty in
"ordinary litigation, such as vehicular collision suits, than in controversial
cases, such as civil rights actions. 83 The AJS determined more conclusively
in 1992, however, that courts imposed Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights
plaintiffs as often as any other category of litigant and that the Rule had
prompted civil rights lawyers to counsel clients to abandon possibly legitimate
suits.
84
The preliminary draft revision of Rule 11 which the Advisory Committee
developed at its May, 1991 meeting warrants only brief treatment. The events
that transpired during the seven hours in which the Committee considered
Rule I 's modification and the written proposal which resulted have been
examined elsewhere.85 Moreover, the Rule revisers subsequently changed
numerous constituents of the preliminary draft. Nonetheless, the major
components of the proposal will be mentioned here, while those elements that
remain important to the new version of Rule 11 will be analyzed in Part III
of this Article.
The Advisory Committee recognized that the widespread criticism of the
1983 version had some merit, although the Committee stated that this
criticism was often exaggerated or premised on incorrect assumptions. The
Committee also observed that the 1983 version's insistence that parties stop
and think before filing was proper and warranted retention, and that numerous
problems which the 1983 amendment had initially created had been re-
solved. 6 The Committee also acknowledged that Rule 11 more often and
more seriously affected plaintiffs, that it had occasionally posed difficulties
for parties who sought to pursue novel legal theories or needed discovery to
develop and prove their cases, that judges had employed fee-shifting as the
sanction of choice, that the Rule afforded insufficient incentives for parties
to abandon positions which became untenable, and that it had sometimes
fostered attorney-client conflicts. In developing the preliminary draft of the
Rule 11 amendment, the Committee refused to limit Rule 11 solely to
intentional violations or to make sanctioning discretionary, because Committee
members believed that the preliminary draft afforded sufficient protections,
such as safe harbors, and that Rule violations would rarely implicate behavior
82. See KRrrzER, supra note 80.
83. Id. at 5-7.
84. Marshall et al., supra note 2, at 965-73.
85. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note I, at 865-93; Vairo, supra note 2, at 495-500.
86. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64. Committee members
made these points numerous times at the meeting which this Author attended in May of 1991. See
generally Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 865-93.
87. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 64-65; see generally Tobias,
Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 865-93.
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which was not deceptive or willful." Instead, the Committee sought to
enhance the Rule's efficacy and fairness as a vehicle to deter litigants from
presenting and maintaining frivolous positions while simultaneously limiting
the number of Rule 11 motions filed by instituting several major changes in
the 1983 version of Rule 11.
The first significant change implemented by the Committee involved the
representations made to the court by attorneys or unrepresented parties. The
Advisory Committee imposed a "continuing duty" on attorneys and unrepre-
sented litigants to withdraw allegations which later research or discovery
indicates are insupportable. 9 The way in which the Committee phrased this
duty also seemed to parse finely the concept of a paper so that parties might
have been required to withdraw rather insignificant components of an
offending paper.90 The Committee correspondingly included a "duty of
candor," which required lawyers or pro se litigants to identify specific
allegations or denials of facts that did not, but were likely to, have evidentiary
support. 91
This "duty of candor" was also a component of the Advisory Committee's
second important modification, which was an attempt to equalize the
responsibilities that Rule 11 imposed on plaintiffs and defendants. For
example, the modification required both defendants and plaintiffs to comply
with the duty of candor,92 while the Committee recognized that plaintiffs
frequently need discovery to substantiate assertions in their papers.93
Another cluster of substantial alterations to the 1983 version of Rule 11
made by the Advisory Committee involved sanctioning procedures, because
the 1983 version had supplied virtually none.94 In its preliminary draft of
what became the 1993 amendment, the Advisory Committee required that
litigants file Rule 11 motions independently of other papers and describe the
particular behavior which allegedly violated the Rule. 95 Moreover, the
Committee incorporated a "safe harbor" provision that gives those who are
targets of Rule 11 motions twenty-one days in which to withdraw papers that
purportedly contravene Rule 11.96 The Committee also prescribed procedures
for affording targets notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to Rule
11 motions and for those found in violation to seek written orders from judges
delineating the offending behavior and explaining why the sanction was
levied.97
88. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 65.
89. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 137 F.R.D. 53, 75 (1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
90. Parts of papers which are subject to the Rule's requirements include "a claim, defense, request,
demand, objection, contention or argument in a... paper." Id.
91. See id. at 76.
92. The Rule applied to "any allegations or denials of facts." Id.
93. Id. at 78 (FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note).
94. See Tobias, Proposed, supra note 1, at 1784.
95. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 76.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 77.
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A final significant change in the 1983 version made by the Advisory
Committee implicated the sanctions to be imposed when Rule 11 is contra-
vened.9" Observers suggest that the Advisory Committee apparently had four
major goals relating to sanctioning in mind when making this change.99 The
Committee wanted to emphasize that courts could assess non-financial
sanctions and that the Rule's principal purpose was to deter litigation abuse.
The Committee also intended to discourage the employment of monetary
assessments by judges, namely attorney fees, and courts' reliance on the Rule
to compensate litigants.
Judge Pointer and Professor Carrington reduced to writing those changes
upon which the Committee had agreed at its May meeting, circulated the draft
for Committee approval, and forwarded a final version to the Standing
Committee in June of 1991.0 The Standing Committee evaluated the
proposed amendment that the Advisory Committee had tendered and inserted
several minor modifications in the draft during July.' The Standing
Committee then issued the proposed amendment of Rule 11 for public
comment, which was required to be submitted by February of 1992, and heard
oral testimony on the proposal at hearings held in November of 1991 and
February of 1992.102
E. Bench-Bar Proposal and Developments Between
March and October of 1992
At the same time that the Standing Committee was soliciting public input
on its proposal, a highly respected group of federal judges and attorneys
circulated a suggestion for amending Rule 11 which was meant to respond to
certain difficulties with the revisers' draft.0 3 Although it remains unclear
precisely what effect the bench-bar proposal had on subsequent decisions to
modify the draft, the bench-bar efforts warrant brief treatment because those
endeavors probably had some influence on the Rule revisers, the effects of
these efforts were controversial at the time, and they offer helpful insights on
implementation of the new Rule. 10 4 The bench-bar group was primarily
concerned that the preliminary draft parsed the idea of a paper too finely, that
imposition of a continuing duty could convert litigation "into a retroactive
exercise in perfected pleadings," and that the prescription of safe harbors
98. See id.
99. See Tobias, Proposed, supra note 1, at 1786-88; Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 880-90.
100. See 1991 Pointer Letter, supra note 65, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 63; see also Tobias,
Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 898.
101. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 74-82; see also Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note
1, at 898.
102. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 53, 56.
103. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR. ET AL., BENCH-BAR PROPOSAL TO REVISE CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 11, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 159 (1991) [hereinafter BENCH-BAR PROPOSAL].
104. Some Rule revisers apparently felt that the bench-bar efforts placed undue public pressure on
them to alter the preliminary draft in ways that they would ultimately have done anyway.
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would afford lawyers strategic benefits and accentuate the deterioration of
professional relationships.'0 5
The bench-bar proposal incorporated certification requirements which
resembled those included in the 1983 revision. The operative language
provided that the signature certifies that "to the best of the signer's know-
ledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the paper
taken as a whole is well grounded in fact and law, including non-frivolous
arguments for possible change of law."'0 6 The bench-bar proposal also made
the imposition of sanctions discretionary while it proscribed attorney fee
awards and required that financial assessments be payable to the clerk of the
court. 0 7 Moreover, the bench-bar proposal incorporated procedural provi-
sions relating to notice and opportunity to be heard and to written findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which are similar to the protections in the
draft.' 8
The developments relating to adoption of the new Rule which occurred
between March and October of 1992 also warrant little examination here,
because those that were important are treated in Part III of the Article. After
the Advisory Committee reviewed the written public comments and oral
testimony submitted on the preliminary draft, the Committee significantly
modified the draft during an April meeting and then tendered the new
proposal to the Standing Committee. 9 Two months later, the Standing
Committee reviewed the April proposal submitted by the Advisory Committee,
incorporated a few insignificant changes, and included the substantial
modification of leaving the decision of whether to impose sanctions for Rule
11 violations to the courts' discretion."0 During September of 1992, the
Judicial Conference, the policy-making arm of the federal courts, endorsed the
Standing Committee proposal without alteration and forwarded that document
to the United States Supreme Court, which was required to approve and
transmit the proposal to Congress before May 1, 1993, in order for it to take
effect in 1993."'
105. BENCH-BAR PROPOSAL, supra note 103, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 159, 162-63.
106. Id. at 165 (emphasis added to show new phrasing proposed by the bench-bar group).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 166; cf supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing the procedural requirements of the
1991 proposal).
109. See 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 521; see also Randall
Samborn, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L LJ., July 6, 1992, at 13.
110. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11, at 46 (July 1992) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENT]; see also Samborn, supra note
109, at 13.
111. See Tobias, Proposed, supra note 1, at 1778; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988); JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS BY THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMriTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 134 F.R.D. 315 (1991).
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F. Supreme Court Review
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the proposed amendment of
Rule 11 as one component of a very ambitious package of rule revisions that
the Standing Committee submitted in the autumn of 1992, and the Court
transmitted the Rule 11 amendment unchanged to Congress on April 22,
1993."2 Justice Byron White, who retired at the end of the Court's 1992
Term, authored a revealing statement that accompanied the proposed
amendment which admonished the bench, bar, Congress, and the public that
the Court plays an extremely limited role in rule revision." 3 Indeed, the
transmittal letter that attended the set of revisions included an even more
telling disclaimer: "While the Court is satisfied that the required procedures
have been observed, this transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the
Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form submit-
ted." '" 4 Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote
a stinging dissent to transmittal of the Rule 11 proposal." 5 This Rule 11
dissent is important and warrants elaboration.
Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's transmittal of the Rule 11
amendment because he believed that the amendment would "eliminate a
significant and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation."" 6 He contended
that the proposal would render Rule 11 toothless by granting courts the
discretion to impose sanctions, by disfavoring reimbursement for the expenses
of litigation, and by prescribing a safe harbor whereby litigants accused of
Rule 11 violations could escape sanctions."'
Justice Scalia criticized the safe harbor provision of the proposal because
it was more solicitous of the attorneys and parties who abuse the litigation
process than of those who are the subjects of that abuse, namely judges and
opposing parties."' He argued that the revision would enable litigants "to
file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure in the knowledge
that they have nothing to lose," as the safe harbor provision would permit
them to withdraw the challenged papers upon notification.' 9
Justice Scalia also objected to making sanctions discretionary, because of
his belief that courts would be reluctant to impose punishment unless their
duties required it. 2 Moreover, he suggested that judges fail to appreciate
the systemic advantages of levying serious sanctions, even though they are
112. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 AMENDMENTS].
113. See id. at 501-06 (Statement of Justice White).
114. See id. at 403 (Transmittal Letter).
115. See id. at 507-10 (Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia).
116. Id. at 507.
117. Id. at 507-08.
118. Id. at 508.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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acutely sensitive to the time that consideration and application of Rule 11
consumes in individual cases.'
Justice Scalia further criticized the proposed amendment's restriction on
sanctioning for compensatory purposes because the restriction would reduce
"the likelihood that frivolousness will even be challenged."' He offered
several examples of limitations included in the proposal which would have the
effect of decreasing the incentives of those best situated to invoke the Rule
and thereby alert judges to the perversion of the litigation process.'
Justice Scalia observed that he would not have dissented had there been
persuasive indication that the existing Rule 11 scheme was inefficacious or
was fostering too much satellite litigation. The dissent neglected to mention,
however, that the Rule's relative ineffectiveness in thwarting frivolous suits
and its encouragement of satellite litigation were two of the very reasons on
which the Advisory Committee relied in deciding to propose the amendment
to Rule 11.124 Moreover, Justice Scalia invoked the responses to the FJC
survey for the proposition that there seemed to be general agreement that the
1983 Rule essentially worked. Those responses did indicate that trial judges
who confront litigation abuse on a daily basis overwhelmingly favored Rule
11, and this convinced Justice Scalia that the 1983 version of Rule 11 should
not be gutted as the proposed amendment envisioned.'25
Justice Scalia only selectively referred to the FJC survey results, however,
neglecting the responses which showed that eighty percent of the judges
believe that groundless litigation is a minor problem and that numerous other
tools are more effective than Rule 11 in combatting it. 2 6 Moreover, had
district court judges been as enamored with the 1983 Rule as Justice Scalia
suggested, they probably could have orchestrated its retention, because each
of the rule revision entities accords great respect to the views of those
judges. 127
G. Congressional Review
Over the last two decades, Congress has evidenced an increased willingness
to intercept proposed rule changes governing evidence and criminal, civil, and
appellate procedures, even though Congress has frequently deferred to the
121. Id.
122. Id. at 508-09 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 509. For example, Justice Scalia asserted that fee-shifting would rarely occur because it
must be warranted for effective deterrence. Id.
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; text following note 58; notes 62, 67, 69 and
accompanying text.
125. 1993 AMENDMENTS, supra note 112, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 509-10 (Dissenting Statement
of Justice Scalia).
126. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
127. See John Frank, Rule 11 -The Need to Start Over (May 1, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, copy
on file with author); see also Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should be
Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1992; supra text accompanying note 60.
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entities below it in the rule revision hierarchy.'28 In June of 1993, the
judiciary subcommittee in the House of Representatives, which is responsible
for oversight of the rule amendment process, held a hearing on the package
of proposals that the Supreme Court had transmitted, and in July its Senate
counterpart conducted a similar session.'29 Few witnesses testified against
the proposed revision of Rule 11; however, many witnesses expressed
vociferous opposition to an automatic disclosure proposal included in the
package of amendments. On July 30, 1993, Representative William Hughes
(D-NJ), chair of the House subcommittee, introduced legislation which would
have deleted the automatic disclosure requirement, but that measure stalled in
the Senate. 130 Senator Hank Brown (R-CO) and several members of the
House of Representatives introduced legislation which would have suspended
the effective date of Rule 11 for one year and, therefore, would have left the
1983 version of Rule 11 intact until then. However, neither judiciary
subcommittee elected to forward this bill to the full committee.' 3 ' The
congressional failure to act on the Rule 11 revision meant that it became
effective on December 1, 1993.132 Thus, this congressional inaction relating
to the proposed amendment of Rule 11, permitted the new Rule to take effect
exactly one decade after the 1983 revision took effect, a revision which
proved to be the most controversial in the history of the Federal Rules.
III. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF NEW RULE 11
A. Introduction
1. A Word About Certain Realities of Rule Revision and
the Implementation of Amendments
It is important to evaluate and to make recommendations for implementing
the new Rule because many difficulties that the 1983 version posed were
attributable more to judicial enforcement and to lawyers' and litigants'
invocation of the provision than to its actual phrasing. Nevertheless, few rule
revisions, particularly revisions which attempt to remedy problems as complex
as those that the revisers sought to rectify when they amended Rule 11 in
1983, and as vexing as the complications presented by that version's
128. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1018-20
(1982); see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules,
43 RUTGERS L. REv. 933, 961 (1991); Tobias, supra note 3, at 293, 337-40. See generally Jack H.
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV.
673 (1975) (discussing judicial power and roles in rule reform).
129. The material in this sentence and the next is premised on conversations with numerous
witnesses who testified at the two hearings.
130. See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Randall Sambom, New Discovery Rules
Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3, 40.
131. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2979, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
132. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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effectuation, can perfectly address all of these difficulties.' These assertions
are true even when the Rule revisers craft amendments as carefully as the
drafters of the 1993 revision of Rule 11 did.1
34
There will be a certain amount of slippage between the purposes which the
revision entities meant to achieve, insofar as courts can accurately discern
their intent, 35 and how judges actually implement the 1993 amendment. A
few novel techniques, such as safe harbors, could pose problems, because, for
example, practitioners and parties may choose to employ these techniques
improperly for strategic benefit, and courts cannot easily detect such activity.
Other ideas or terms included in the 1993 amendment, such as "nonfrivolous,"
are ambiguous, and judges could afford them multiple and/or subjective
interpretations. Still additional notions or terminology, such as "reasonable-
ness" or "appropriate sanctions," will resist consistent application, as they are
the clearest or most specific phrasing which can accommodate a wide range
of factual circumstances. Some pragmatic realities, therefore, apparently
required that the revisers place their trust in judicial discretion when
effectuating the new Rule and perhaps in attorneys' and litigants' good faith
and common sense when invoking it.
In short, certain complications similar to the problems experienced with the
1983 revision, as well as new, unpredictable difficulties, could attend the
implementation of the 1993 Rule. Nonetheless, some guidance may remedy
or ameliorate a number of these complications, and it is important to attempt
to minimize them. The remainder of this Article therefore analyzes and offers
suggestions for effectuating the new Rule. These recommendations are
primarily meant to assist judges who will be applying and construing the 1993
amendment. Much guidance is also intended to help counsel and parties
comply with the revision while persuading them to exercise restraint when
employing it.
2. Generic Concepts Relating to Rule Violations
Two issues warrant brief treatment here, although they are extensively
examined below in suggesting different approaches for applying the Rule's
133. See Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 1, at 513-26 (suggesting that civil rights plaintiffs' difficulties
with the 1983 version were attributable more to application); Tobias, supra note 3, at 335 (including
similar assertions regarding public interest litigants and Rule 11 as well as other federal rules); see
generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983)
(noting the difficulty of drafting and applying precise rules).
134. See, eg., Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 WVIS. L. REv. 236; Tobias, Reconsidering,
supra note 1, at 892-93.
135. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CM-. L. REV. 494,
498-99, 508 (1986) (acknowledging restrictions that impaired the attempt to record the intent of the
drafters of the 1938 Rules); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 857-97 (attempting to document
revisers' intent by attending the Advisory Committee meeting at which the Committee formulated the
May, 1991 proposal); cf id. at 857 n.2 (acknowledging restrictions that impair attempts to record
drafters' intent).
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specific components. 3 6 One issue involves the relative weight that judges
should accord to the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries (conduct) on the one
hand and to the sufficiency of legal contentions or factual assertions in papers
(product) on the other. The new Rule's text is silent on this particular
question, but it does impose requirements pertaining to both conduct and
product. The text provides that prefiling inquiries be reasonable under the
circumstances, and this implicates certain factors, such as resources and
access to information, which are important to the second issue discussed
below. Moreover, the revisers expressly decided to retain the inquiries and the
stop-and-think duties, so that courts ought to assign prefiling inquiries
considerable significance. 3 ' The precise value that judges should attach will
depend on how seriously and why unrepresented parties or practitioners have
contravened particular constituents of the 1993 Rule and how well they have
satisfied the remaining components. In short, courts should perform finely
calibrated assessments when considering the new Rule's discrete parts."as
The second general issue relates to resource-deficient litigants, such as
many civil rights plaintiffs, and to their lawyers as well as to certain inherent
characteristics of the cases that they pursue.'39 For example, civil rights
plaintiffs and attorneys, in comparison to their adversaries, which are often
governmental units or in-house counsel, have little access to relevant
.information and possess limited resources for conducting factual investiga-
tions, assembling, analyzing, and synthesizing material, performing legal
136. The new Rule provides in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifi ng that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery, and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1l(b), reprinted in 146 F.RtD. at 420-21.
137. See infra notes 143, 153 and accompanying text. It is important to emphasize that the new Rule
retains the requirement that prefiling inquiries be reasonable under the circumstances, which include
factors such as resources, access to information, and time. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. at 420-21; cf Bradgate Assocs. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., 999 F.2d 745,751-53 (3d Cir. 1993)
(providing a helpful recent example of a case in which the 1983 version was applied).
138. See, e.g., infra notes 161-63, 186-92 and accompanying text; cf FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory
committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 587 (suggesting that judges consider factors relating to
product and conduct and perform similar assessments when choosing appropriate sanctions).
139. In the remainder of this part, I substantially rely on Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and
Rule 11, 33 WM & MARY L. REV. 429, 457-59 (1992), and Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 1, at 495-98.
See also Yamamoto, supra note 1. This treatment is necessarily general and is meant to familiarize
readers with some features of civil rights litigation that can make Rule 1I's application problematic for
those bringing such suits. Greater specificity will attend suggestions for implementing each part of the
1993 version of Rule 11. See infra part llI.B.
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research, and drafting papers. 4 ° Civil rights suits, in contrast to private,
two-party actions, correspondingly involve public issues and large numbers
of individuals and entities.'
4
'
The intrinsic nature of civil rights actions, and the restraints under which
numerous civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys labor, can cause these indivi-
duals to appear to be in violation of Rule 11. These ideas apply to Rule I I's
provisions governing legal certification. For instance, a significant number of
civil rights cases assert novel or relatively untested legal theories, which are
at the cutting edge of the law. This means that civil rights lawyers can
experience considerable difficulty formulating and supporting those theories
and that they often need discovery to make their theories more precise.
Moreover, these theories, once conceptualized, frequently look rather
nontraditional and perhaps even unreasonable. These factors may cause the
legal contentions presented and the inquiries that preceded them to seem
violative of Rule I l's requirements.
42
These inherent characteristics and restrictions can concomitantly make civil
rights plaintiffs and attorneys appear to contravene the factual certification
requirement of Rule 11. Such litigants may not be aware of information
significant to their cases or understand the importance of data that are relevant
to stating their causes of action. The parties rarely possess, or have access to,
material substantiating their suits because this material is in the defendants'
minds or records. Even when the information is available, many civil rights
plaintiffs have insufficient time and money to gather and evaluate it. These
factors can cause the plaintiffs' factual investigations and their factual
assertions to look deficient.
140. Individual plaintiffs may be comparatively impecunious and have little access to pertinent
information. Numerous civil rights attorneys are specialized solo practitioners who rely substantially on
fee-shifting and contingency fees. These attorneys may have cash flow problems and difficulties in
diversifying litigation risks and handling large upfront expenses. See Tobias, supra note 139, at 457-59.
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1986) (asserting the unique economic position of the plaintiff's attorney when private litigants enforce
substantive law). Valuable recent research also indicates that a large number of individuals who have
clearly suffered discrimination are reluctant to vindicate their rights through litigation because these
persons distrust the legal system or fear that they will lose even more by suing. See, e.g., KRISTEN
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SoCIETY (1988).
141. For instance, in civil rights cases, many persons may attempt to give meaning to general
constitutional or statutory commands by showing that governmental employees participated in
discriminatory practices over a long period and by seeking to enjoin future, similar behavior. See Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976)
(contrasting the salient characteristics of private and public law litigation, of which civil rights litigation
comprises a major subset).
142. To a lesser extent, the restraints that hamper those bringing civil rights actions can leave the
impression that they failed to satisfy the legal certification requirements of Rule 11. For example, the
plaintiff's lack of resources and access to information can make their legal research seem truncated and
their legal theories unrefined. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085
(7th Cir. 1987) (Cuhady, J., dissenting) (recognizing resource restraints), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901
(1988); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (Butzner, J., dissenting) (recognizing time
restraints).
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In short, the intrinsic nature of considerable civil rights litigation and the
restraints which impede many civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners may
make their efforts to comply with Rule lI 's strictures covering prefiling
inquiries and legal and factual certifications seem inadequate. These inherent
characteristics, particularly the parties' and attorneys' lack of money, time,
power, and access to information involving their cases, also explain why these
litigants and their counsel may be risk averse and why Rule 1 l's invocation
might chill their efforts.
B. Evaluation and Recommendations Regarding
Implementation of New Rule 11
1. Representations to Court
The 1993 Rule retains the 1983 provision's requirements that lawyers and
unrepresented parties (1) perform reasonable legal inquiries and factual
investigations before presenting papers to courts, (2) submit documents which
have legal and factual support, and (3) not tender the papers for improper
purposes. Judge Pointer observed that the Rule's text keeps the "basic
requirement for pre-filing investigation" while remarking that the Advisory
Committee Note clearly states that "pleading on information and belief must
be preceded by an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances."' 43 Neverthe-
less, the new Rule substantially alters some particulars of the 1983 amend-
ment which govern representations made to the court.
a. Continuing Duty
One very significant component of the Advisory Committee's 1991
preliminary draft was its imposition of a continuing duty, which commanded
attorneys and pro se litigants to withdraw any "claim, defense, request,
demand, objection, contention, or argument in a pleading, written motion or
other paper" as soon as it became insupportable.' Compliance with this
responsibility would have been overly burdensome for numerous counsel and
parties, especially those possessing limited resources or pursuing relatively
nontraditional suits or close cases. For instance, the obligation parsed the
concept of a paper too finely, rather than treating papers as a whole. 4 ' The
duty concomitantly required that practitioners and litigants identify and
meticulously follow every allegation included in their papers throughout
143. 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524; see also FED. R. Civ. P.
1 (b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-2 1; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 583, 584-86.
144. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 75.
145. A number of courts had subscribed to the "paper as a whole" approach. See, e.g., Burull v. First
Nat'l Bank, 831 F.2d 788, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Brown v.
Federation of State Medical Bds. of the United States, 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri
v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). But see Townsend
v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362-65 (9th Cir. 1990).
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particular cases so that they could promptly withdraw each assertion once it
lost its merit.14
6
The new Rule significantly changes the continuing obligation included in
the 1991 preliminary draft, which applied to attorneys and unrepresented
parties who continued championing a position in a paper after ascertaining
through discovery or otherwise that it was untenable. 147 The Advisory
Committee characterized as "well-taken" the criticism that the 1991 proposal
"might lead to disruptive and wasteful activities based on a mere failure to re-
read and amend previously filed [papers]." 148 The Committee responded by
making "several modifications to the published language of the text,"
principally by imposing the duty only on an individual "who 'pursues' a
previously filed paper."'49
The 1993 version of Rule 11 also modifies the Advisory Committee's 1991
preliminary draft by defining the idea of a paper more broadly. The new
Rule's text replaces the narrow words "claim, defense, request, demand,
objection, contention, or argument" with the phrase "pleading, written motion,
or other paper."' 150 The Advisory Committee Note correspondingly admon-
ishes lawyers and litigants not to file or threaten to file motions for sanctions
for "minor, inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed [in Rule
11(b)] ... or to test the legal sufficiency or efficacy of allegations in the
pleadings."'..
Judge Pointer's letter transmitting these alterations to the Standing
Committee confirms the Advisory Committee's intent that judges, attorneys,
and parties treat the notion of a paper more expansively:
[T]he language of the [May, 1991] draft might have inappropriately
encouraged an excessive number of Rule 11 motions premised upon a
detailed parsing of pleadings and motions. The Advisory Committee has
changed the text of subdivision (b) to eliminate the specific reference to a
"claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or argument" and
146. These problems may explain why numerous federal appellate courts refused to impose a
continuing duty. Compare Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that there is no continuing duty) and Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that there is no continuing duty) with Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co.,
900 F.2d 388, 393 (lst Cir.) (holding that there is a continuing duty), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 891 (1990).
Cf Tobias, supra note 139, at 442 n.65 (providing additional primary authority).
147. Compare PRELImINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 75 (using the phrase "presenting or
maintaining") with FED. R. CiV. P. 11(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21 (using the phrase
"presenting by ... later advocating"). The duties include not "insisting upon a position after it is no
longer tenable" and "reaffirming to the court and advocating positions in [papers] after learning that they
cease to have any merit." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.RLD. 583,
585. Judge Pointer's 1992 Letter confirms these ideas. 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 519, 523. Although Judge Pointer made this statement before the Standing Committee
drafted its final proposal, the statement appears reliable, because the Standing Committee changed none
of its substance. This is true whenever the Article cites to Judge Pointer's 1992 Letter in support of
specific propositions.
148. 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.RD. 519, 523.
149. Id.; see also supra note 147.
150. See FED. R CIV. P. 11(b), reprinted in 146 F.1.D. at 420-21; see also PREIMARY DRAFT,
supra note 89, at 75.
151. FED. 1. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 590.
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has also modified the accompanying Notes to emphasize that Rule 11
-motions should not be prepared-or threatened-for minor, inconsequential
violations or as a substitute for traditional motions specifically designed to
enable parties to challenge the sufficiency of pleadings. These changes,
coupled with the opportunity to correct allegations under the "safe harbor"
provisions, should eliminate the need for court consideration of Rule 11
motions directed at insignificant aspects of a complaint or answer .
5 2
Although the Advisory Committee apparently desired the concept of a paper
to be read more broadly, it also rejected the very expansive "paper as a
whole" approach. In response to several comments urging adoption of this
approach, Judge Pointer stated that the Advisory Committee continued to
believe that the "stop-and-think" duties should apply to each assertion or
allegation, not merely to a majority of them.' Moreover, the Standing
Committee voted nine to three against incorporating the "paper as a whole"
idea. 5 4 In short, the best indicators of the revisers' intent on the issue of
how finely the concept of a paper should be parsed are apparently in the new
Rule's text and the Advisory Committee Note as elaborated by Judge Pointer's
May, 1992 letter.
Therefore, courts asked to find that lawyers or pro se litigants have
contravened the 1993 Rule's continuing duty should do so only when such
lawyers or litigants persist in advocating a position after learning that it is
invalid. Judges should also remember that they can treat egregious conduct
which occurs after parties initially file their claims by employing other
Federal Rules, such as the sanctions provisions in Rules 26 and 37, measures
in the United States Code (namely Section 1927 of Title 28), civil contempt,
and their inherent judicial authority. 5
It is difficult to delineate with precision how finely the concept of a paper
should be parsed under the new Rule. The revisers clearly instruct lawyers
and litigants that they must not threaten or prepare Rule 11 motions for
"minor, inconsequential violations" or violations based upon a "detailed
parsing" of papers, and the revisers expressly inform courts that they should
not entertain "motions directed at insignificant aspects" of papers.'56
Moreover, the Rule revisers replaced the 1991 preliminary draft's broad
textual phrase "a pleading, written motion, or other paper" with the particular-
ized reference to a "claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention,
or argument."' 5 7 Nevertheless, the revisers did retain several constituents of
the refined litany in the same subsection of the new Rule, while they
152. 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524.
153. Id.
154. Memorandum of John Frank, Esq., Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz. (June 19, 1992) (copy on file
with author); see also supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
155. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 869, 900 (discussing this proposition and discussing
citations to primary sources); Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 1, at 514 (discussing the proposing and
providing citations to primary sources); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 423-24
(observing that new Rule 11 is inapplicable to discovery).
156. See 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524; see also supra note
151 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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explicitly observed that the "stop-and-think" duties apply to every allegation
and assertion and specifically rejected the "paper as a whole approach."' 158
The revisers, therefore, are apparently requiring attorneys and unrepresented
parties to undertake reasonable prefiling inquiries as to each allegation and
assertion in a paper. The revisers also suggest, however, that the Rule applies
neither to unimportant violations of this obligation or of the responsibility to
present legally and factually sufficient papers nor to alleged deficiencies
involving insignificant portions of papers.'59
There are several possible responses to the difficulty inherent in assigning
the optimal specificity to the notion of a paper for purposes of triggering Rule
11. The preferable approach would employ a finely calibrated assessment
which considers the challenged misbehavior's severity, defined more
particularly in terms of the prefiling inquiry's unreasonableness, and the
questioned paper's deficiency, defined more specifically in terms of the
insufficiency of its legal contentions or the inadequacy of evidentiary support
for its factual allegations. 6
The relative gravity of the misconduct in performing the prefiling inquiry
and the comparative insufficiency of the legal or factual material in the paper
should be the principal components of most analyses, although quantitative
measures will occasionally be important. An extremely careless prefiling
inquiry, the presentation of a paper with one crucial, highly deficient legal
contention, or a paper containing several material factual allegations that lack
much evidentiary substantiation, therefore, might be treated as significant
violations which should activate Rule 11.
More specific examples clarify these suggestions for implementation. For
instance, if a civil rights lawyer with two years to file expended little time
researching the law and submitted a complaint that included a legal theory
central to the case which clearly conflicted with a settled, unanimous Supreme
Court holding, this prefiling inquiry and the legal contention could trigger
Rule 11.I6' In contrast, if an attorney, contacted by a person injured in an
automobile accident two days before the expiration of the statute of
limitations, then filed a complaint claiming that the collision occurred at Third
and Pine when it actually happened at Third and Spruce, this factual assertion
should be treated as an "insignificant [allegation] of a complaint."' 62 The
158. See FED. t. Civ. P. ll(b)(2), reprinted in 146 F.RD. at 420-21 (using the phrase "claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions"); see also supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (discussing
"stop-and-think" duties and rejection of the "paper as a whole" concept).
159. This is my best effort to harmonize the revisers' pronouncements in this area. My attempt is
not intended as a criticism of the revisers' diligent, careful efforts, which may even appear inconsistent,
but is instead meant to recognize the task's difficulty.
160. This is an effort to consider, and assign relative weight to, both the reasonableness of the
prefiling inquiry (conduct) and the sufficiency of the papers (product). These concepts are elaborated
at supra text accompanying notes 137-38, and infra text accompanying notes 187-93.
161. Time is only one relevant factor and may be overemphasized in this example and the two that
follow. Numerous other factors, such as the lawyers' and litigants' resources, good faith, and effort, may
also be relevant. Moreover, the three examples provided in the text are obviously not exhaustive.
162. 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524. I am indebted to John
Frank, Esq., Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz., for the textual example. That illustration expressly
emphasizes the qualitative insignificance of the factual assertion but implicitly involves the limited time
available to conduct the nrefilina investization.
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calculus in the second illustration would change considerably if the client had
hired the lawyer twenty months earlier, but the attorney had undertaken only
a rather limited factual investigation and submitted a complaint which
included a substantial number of factual errors. In short, just as one egregious
violation or multiple, relatively serious infractions of Rule 1 I's requirements
governing the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries or of the legal and factual
adequacy of papers can activate the new Rule, so might numerous compara-
tively insignificant violations.
b. Certification Respecting Law
The critical change included in the 1993 amendment of Rule 11 regarding
the sufficiency of the legal certification is the requirement that attorneys and
unrepresented parties present papers which are warranted by a nonfrivolous,
rather than a good faith, "argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law." 63 One of the major
complications attending this change in wording is that the "good faith"
terminology had acquired certain meaning with which judges, lawyers, and
litigants were familiar. Practitioners and parties could readily conform to this
"good faith" standard and show that they had complied, while courts could
easily enforce the requirement.
64
Many judges had correspondingly experienced problems interpreting and
applying the term "frivolous" in the context of the 1983 version.'65
Numerous courts encountered difficulty defining the term, articulating
consistent standards for identifying it, and providing clear guidance to counsel
and litigants, partly because the legal contentions that attorneys and parties
present in individual cases differ significantly. 66 In determining whether
papers were frivolous, a number of judges overemphasized the quality of the
papers or the merits of their legal arguments or the litigation (product), as
contrasted with the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries (conduct). 67 This
163. FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-2 1. The new Rule, like the 1983
version, initially mandates that papers be warranted by existing law. See id.; FED. R. Civ. P. I 1(1983
revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68.
164. Several Advisory Committee members voiced these concerns during the 1991 meeting. See
Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 871 n.90.
165. See, e.g., ViON Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Romero v. City
of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989). Courts read "frivolousness" into, and even in the teeth
of, the 1983 Rule, which does not even actually use the term. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision),
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68; see also Burbank, supra note 5, at 1933-34, 1941-42.
166. See BURBANK, supra note 26, at 20-21; Tobias, supra note 71, at 226.
167. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Even rather
clear opinions emphasized the papers or the merits. See, e.g., Alia v. Michigan Sup. Ct., 906 F.2d 1100,
1103 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., dissenting); Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 538 (1 1th Cir. 1990). Conduct
and product are relevant. Nonetheless, judges who unduly emphasize product could permit their views
of the papers or the merits to affect their frivolousness determination. See, e.g., Healey v. Chelsea
Resources, 947 F.2d 611, 623 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing this possibility); see also infra notes 183-86
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has cautioned against equating loss on the merits with
frivolousness. See Nietkze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978); see also infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. It may be preferable
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last problem implicates the closely related question of whether, and if so,
precisely how much, a reasonable prefiling inquiry ameliorates a legal
argument that a court specifically finds to be frivolous. The Rule revisers
offer little guidance for resolving these issues, although the Advisory
Committee Note affords some indication of the revisers' thinking. 68
The problems of defining and applying the term "frivolous" remain, even
though at least one court has asserted that the word has an "established legal
meaning in various contexts." 169 When interpreting the 1983 version of Rule
11, judges formulated numerous articulations of the term, which ranged across
a broad spectrum. Some courts strictly defined the concept, finding a "legally
unreasonable filing to be frivolous." 7 ° A similar number of courts leniently
defined the term, stating that only legal contentions which are "baseless,"' '
"meritless,"' 72 or have "no chance of success"173 can be frivolous. Most
courts employed a rather moderate definition, holding that a complaint which
was not "well-grounded in law" could be sanctioned as frivolous.'74
Courts have propounded additional definitions in contexts other than, but
closely related to, Rule 11. For example, judges have characterized as
"frivolous" claims which were "not colorable" or were "without arguable
merit" in deciding whether to shift attorney fees against losing plaintiffs who
pursued cases under statutes prescribing fee-shifting to prevailing parties."'
In the context of determining whether a plaintiff could proceed in forma
pauperis, the United States Supreme Court has similarly defined a frivolous
for courts to accord prefiling inquiries enhanced weight. See Tobias, supra note 27, at 108; see also
Burbank, supra note 5, at 1933-34, 1941-42. But see Vairo, supra note 2, at 497.
168. Virtually all of the relevant guidance given by the revisers pertains to the issue in the sentence
to which this note is appended and therefore is treated below. See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying
text.
169. See ViON Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
170. See, eg., United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), on remand, 637 F.Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). As used in this Article,
the term "strict" denotes a low standard, that is, one that is easily violated.
171. See, e.g., Townsend v. Holman Consulting, 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990); cf Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (stating that Rule 1l's central purpose is to deter
baseless filing). I use the term "lenient" to mean a high standard, one that is difficult to violate.
172. See, e.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir.
1988); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1555-57 (11th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d
1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
173. See, e.g., Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028
(1991); Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1989); Oliveri, 803
F.2d at 1275.
174. See, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969 (1991);
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
175. See, e.g., Hawaiian Engraving v. Fujikami, 947 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1991); Geshwind v. Garrick,
738 F. Supp. 792, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), afl'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 58
(1991); see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). This articulation could
have special applicability to the new Rule and to civil rights plaintiffs because it is derived from the
Christiansburg Garment opinion. See also infra note 245 and accompanying text. The difficulty with
Christiansburg Garment is that it speaks in terms of vexatiousness, meritlessness, frivolousness, and
unreasonableness. Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 421-22. But cf Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
14 (1980) (holding that, in order to shift fees, plaintiff's action must be meritless in the sense that it is
groundless or without foundation).
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complaint as one in which "' [none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their
merits."" 7 6 Judges have also described frivolous appeals as those in which
the arguments were wholly without merit or those in which the results were
obvious 7 7 or were "'foreordained by the lack of substance of appellant's
arguments" ' 7 8 in deciding whether to shift fees.
In short, in determining what "frivolous," as used in the 1993 Rule 11
amendment should mean, courts could employ all of these definitions, but
none has compelling applicability. For instance, the definitions which judges
formulated in the context of the 1983 Rule might seem most relevant;
however, it is important to remember that the drafters of the 1983 amendment
and of the 1993 revision had different purposes when amending the respective
rules. Moreover, courts interpreting the term "frivolous" in connection with
the 1983 Rule enunciated multiple articulations, which encompassed a wide
spectrum in terms of stringency. Furthermore, most of the definitions
apparently drew on other concepts in the 1983 version or have considerable
potential for inconsistent or subjective application. Similarly, the definitions
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the Christiansburg Garment
line of cases might appear particularly relevant because the Advisory
Committee Note expressly refers to the Christiansburg Garment opinion."
Nonetheless, the numerous ways that judges defined "frivolous" in those
cases, especially in terms of stringency, and the peculiar context in which
courts decided these cases undermine the efficacy of these pronounce-
ments.'80
In the final analysis, these definitional sources are not dispositive, and no
single definition appears preferable. Indeed, one court acknowledged and
championed the lack of a bright-line test for frivolousness, given the need for
an "intensely fact-bound inquiry.''. It is appropriate, therefore, to draw
selectively on the definitions examined above and the general policies that
underlie the 1993 amendment. The most important general objective that
courts should keep in mind when determining the meaning of the term
17,6. See Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (alterations in original) (quoting Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)); cf. Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 539 (lst Cir. 1993) (finding
that an "indisputably meritless legal theory" was frivolous); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct.
1728, 1733 (1992) (holding that a factually frivolous claim must be "clearly baseless," "fanciful,"
"fantastic," or "delusional").
177. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746,761 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Hays v. Sony Corp.,
847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988).
178. White v. General Motors Corp., I F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)); accord Olympia Co. v. Celotex
Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989).
179. See FED. R. CIV. P. I I advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 588; see also
infra note 245 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. For instance, the judges in these cases rarely
considered a single legal contention and instead employed a special double standard for shifting fees
between plaintiffs and defendants. Courts correspondingly enunciated four articulations of the standard
for shifting fees, only one of which was frivolousness. See also infra note 245 and accompanying text.
18 . Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 1990). Numerous other
courts stated that the 1983 version of Rule 11 required a fact-intensive or fact-bound inquiry. See, e.g.,
Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 933; Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988).
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"frivolous," as used in the 1993 amendment, is the revisers' clear intent to
reduce significantly the new Rule's invocation, particularly by discouraging
motions premised on insignificant violations and by limiting technical judicial
application.12
One way of defining the term "frivolous" as it is used in the 1993 version
of Rule 11 is to delineate what it is not. For example, the mere absence of
precedent, the failure to prevail on the merits of a specific legal contention
or in the entire litigation, or the presentation of an unreasonable legal
argument must never alone justify a finding of frivolousness. Another way in
which to define the term is to afford affirmative articulations. For instance,
"frivolous" should connote that the legal contention is utterly implausible,
lacks any arguable basis, is characterized by egregiousness or abuse, or is at
least meritless or groundless.'83 It would also be helpful for judges to keep in
mind those cases such as Brown v. Board of Education' 4 and Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products'85 which successfully vindicated legal theories that
had little support in the law when they were employed and which courts could
well have deemed to be frivolous. 86
When judges do ascertain that legal contentions are frivolous, the courts
must then decide whether and, if so, to what extent substantially reasonable
prefiling inquiries mitigate these determinations. The revisers provided rather
minimal guidance to courts which must treat this question, but the Advisory
Committee Note includes considerable pertinent material.
In the Advisory Committee Note, the revisers admonish that use of the term
"nonfrivolous" "establishes an objective standard, intended to eliminate any
'empty-head pure-heart' justification for patently frivolous arguments."' 87
The Note also instructs that it is important to stress, and judges should
182. See, eg., supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
183. Many courts have espoused these and similar articulations. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes
171-78 and accompanying text. Numerous arguments support reliance on something more than simple
negligence or losing in defining and applying the term "frivolous." See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITtEE TO CONSIDER SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION IN
NEW YORK STATE COURTS (Mar. 20, 1990), reprinted in 18 FORDHAM URB. UJ. 3, 12 (1990)
(observing that the "process of winning and losing takes ample care" of frivolous papers); Vairo, supra
note 2, at 492 (including the same assertion); see also supra text accompanying note 182 (noting that
drafters' general goals in adopting new Rule support elevated standard).
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
186. Judges applying the 1983 Rule have suggested similar ideas. See, e.g., Blue v. United States
Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 534-35 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), on remandfrom 762 F.2d 243 (2d
Cir. 1985), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586-87. Despite the
drafters' use of the phrase "objective standard," the concept of frivolousness actually has great potential
to be applied subjectively. Many judges applying the concept to the 1983 Rule apparently employed a
subjective approach that reflected their view of the merits or the validity of the legal theories. Courts'
perspectives on the substance of the lawsuits understandably merged with their consideration of
frivolousness. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. For instance, judges who ruled against a
litigant on the merits might well consider the party's legal contentions with disfavor for purposes of
ascertaining frivolousness. I appreciate that the drafters may have been using the term "subjective"
differently to mean, for example, from the sanction target's perspective.
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remember, that "patently frivolous arguments" are much worse than merely
frivolous ones. The drafters could be suggesting that courts which find
contentions to be less than patently frivolous should consider the reasonable-
ness of prefiling inquiries relevant to the frivolousness determination. Indeed,
in the Note's next sentence, the revisers' emphasis on conduct sharply
undercuts the significance that the "empty-head" quotation might have
accorded the product approach: "However, the extent to which a litigant has
researched the issues and found some support for its theories even in minority
opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys
should certainly be taken into account in determining whether paragraph (2)
has been violated."' 8 This allusion to the second paragraph of Rule 11
underscores the importance of conduct, because that paragraph includes the
nonfrivolous requirement, not the prefiling inquiry stricture." 9 The drafters
seem to be saying, therefore, that the reasonableness of the prefiling legal
inquiry (conduct) has significance in ascertaining whether the legal contention
(product) which the inquiry produced is frivolous. The Advisory Committee
Note also instructs that Rule I l's text does not command lawyers or pro se
litigants to designate specifically that they are arguing for a change in the
law, even though a "contention that is so identified should be viewed with
greater tolerance under the rule."' 90
A fair reading of this material in the Advisory Committee Note evidences
the revisers' intent that an "empty-head pure-heart" justification should not
excuse "patently frivolous arguments," although parties might even mitigate
such offensive filings by showing that they performed highly reasonable
prefiling inquiries and by very forthrightly disclosing to courts that the
contentions advocate legal change. When the legal arguments are less
egregious than "patently frivolous," the reasonableness of the prefiling
inquiries and the degree of the litigants' candor in revealing that contentions
advocate changes in the law should be accorded much greater weight. How
reasonable the prefiling inquiries are, how candid the parties are, and how
frivolous the arguments are will obviously differ in particular circumstances,
thereby complicating the advance assignment of the relative weight which
should be given to these factors.
It may be preferable, accordingly, to utilize case-by-case assessments of the
variables that comprise specific situations. 9' For instance, a somewhat
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 587. The quotation
principally speaks to conduct, although it may partly implicate product.
189. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 420-21.
190. See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 587; cf Golden
Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (articulating a duty of
candor), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531, 1539 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a duty of candor might chill advocacy).
An early Rule 11 draft imposed the duty of candor only upon legal contentions, but it was subsequently
omitted. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 873 n.105; see also infra note 207 and
accompanying text.
191. This suggested judicial treatment resembles that proposed earlier for judges considering how
finely to parse papers. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. Courts should extrapolate from
the recommendations provided in the text and apply them there. See also infra notes 213-17 and
accompanying text (suggesting similar treatment for compliance with factual certification requirements).
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frivolous contention which results from an extremely careful prefiling legal
inquiry combined with a frank admission to the judge that the litigant is
attempting to create new law should not be considered violative of Rule I's
legal certification requirement. In contrast, barring a showing of extenuating
circumstances, such as an exceptionally meticulous legal inquiry or an
exceedingly candid revelation that an argument advocates a change in the law,
a legal contention which a court deems patently frivolous should always be
found to contravene the new Rule."2
Finally, in making the frivolousness determination, judges should remember
numerous factors that have peculiar applicability to resource-poor litigants,
such as civil rights plaintiffs, and to their counsel. 93 Certain characteristics,
which are intrinsic to the circumstances and cases of these parties and
practitioners, can make the prefiling legal inquiries that the parties and
lawyers conduct appear relatively unreasonable and the contentions which they
assert seem rather frivolous. For example, many civil rights plaintiffs possess
few resources and have comparatively little education, which means that they
may provide limited assistance to their attorneys in developing legal theories.
Many lawyers who represent civil rights plaintiffs and other litigants who lack
time, money, and power also have relatively few resources. These attorneys,
therefore, may possess insufficient time to research thoroughly and draft
carefully, persuasive legal theories. The lawyers might not even have a
network of colleagues from whom they can seek advice on the efficacy of
draft pleadings. The legal theories that these lawyers incorporate in their
papers can thus look rather frivolous. These theories are less traditional, are
on the cutting edge of legal development, or are meant to establish new law.
Furthermore, researching, articulating, and crafting such theories demands the
kind of creativity which few attorneys possess.
c. Certification Respecting Factual Assertions
The new Rule 11 requires plaintiff's counsel, as well as pro se plaintiffs,
to certify that any "allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have'evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."'9 4
Defendant's attorneys and pro se defendants must correspondingly certify that
all "denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence, or if
192. See Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (providing an example of a
legal contention in a civil rights case found "not patently frivolous"). These textual illustrations are
obviously not exhaustive. For example, additional quantitative and qualitative factors relating to product
can also be relevant. Four frivolous legal arguments, therefore, will ordinarily be worse than a single
frivolous contention, although the latter could be violative if it were critical enough to the paper or
sufficiently frivolous. Cf supra note 161 and accompanying text.
193. This paragraph provides several examples more specifically related to the legal certification
requirements. See also supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
194. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(4), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421.
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specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief."'95
The revisers, when modifying the provision in the 1983 amendment which
required signers to certify that papers were "well grounded in fact,"' 
96
expressly acknowledged that parties could have plausible reasons to think that
facts were either false or true yet might need discovery to collect and confirm
evidentiary substantiation of these facts. 97 In the Advisory Committee Note,
the revisers clearly stated that the alterations were an explicit effort "to
equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs and defendants."' 98
Additional indicia of the reasons for the revisers' changes can be found in
much of the new Rule's phrasing and in the other portions of the Advisory
Committee Note. For example, the new Rule's text affords plaintiffs
reasonable opportunities for both investigation and discovery, apparently
recognizing the restraints involving time, money, and access to information,
under which a number of litigants and their counsel, such as those pursuing
civil rights cases, can operate. 199 The text similarly permits plaintiffs to
present contentions that are only "likely to have evidentiary support,"2 0
even though the language demands that defendants submit denials which are
"reasonably based on a lack of information or belief." ''
The Advisory Committee Note elaborates on the respective responsibilities
that the rather cryptic text imposes on each party. According to the Note,
plaintiffs need merely certify that there actually is or is likely to be
evidentiary substantiation for their allegations, not that they will prevail on
their contentions regarding specific facts. 20 2 The entry of summary judg-
ment, therefore, would not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs allegations
lacked any evidentiary support and that the plaintiff was thus in violation of
Rule 11.203 The Note states that denials implicate somewhat different
factors.20 4 The Advisory Committee allows a defendant not to admit
contentions which the litigant thinks are false, if prefiling investigation yields
inadequate information or leads to reasonable doubt about the credibility of
the only evidence respecting the matter at issue.0 5
The Note also instructs both plaintiffs and defendants that the Rule's
tolerance for pleading on information and belief when specifically identified
neither relieves them from performing a reasonable factual investigation nor
permits the joinder of parties or the presentation of claims or defenses
195. Id.
196. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68.
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 585.
198. Id. at 586.
199. See FED. R. Civ. P. I l(b)(3), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421; see also supra notes 139-40 and
accompanying text.
200. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)(3), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421 (emphasis added).
201. See id. (b)(4), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421 (emphasis added).
202. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
[Vol. 70:171
REISED RULE 11
"without any factual basis or justification."2 ' This "duty of candor,"
requiring litigants who make assertions that may lack evidentiary support to
identify specifically that possibility, can be very burdensome, particularly for
parties with limited access to information involving their allegations or few
resources for gathering, assessing, and synthesizing that material which is
accessible.0 7 When pertinent information is in the defendants' minds or
files, for example, plaintiffs will encounter great difficulty in specifically
delineating contentions which are likely to be substantiated after reasonable
opportunity for additional investigation or discovery, before they have had
that opportunity."'8 Even if the plaintiffs do not participate in unalloyed
speculation, they would still experience problems designating those allegations
which probably will have support, identifying them with sufficient particu-
larity, and ascertaining what is a reasonable opportunity.29
Defendants may have somewhat similar, although less, difficulty delineating
denials that are "reasonably based on a lack of information or belief' and
identifying them with the requisite specificity. This is true because Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presently permits defendants "without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment" to so plead and also because most defendants have greater access
to, and possess more resources for assembling and analyzing, material which
supports their denials.10
The new Rule 1 l's duty of candor could well embroil courts, parties, and
practitioners in precisely the kinds of fact-sensitive inquiries that bedeviled
the 1983 version of Rule 11, fostering inconsistent judicial interpretation and
application, promoting satellite litigation, and chilling advocacy. Motions
for sanctions challenging the types of close judgment calls that plaintiffs may
have to make will tax the abilities of those plaintiffs' lawyers with even the
sharpest memories who exercise the utmost care when investigating facts and
when preparing and presenting factual contentions. For instance, the Rule's
invocation will require that these attorneys reflect back to a late night several
years earlier when, hurrying to satisfy a statute of limitations, they decided
which factual allegations were likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for more investigation, how to identify those
206. Id. at 585; see also 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524.
207. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(articulating a duty of candor), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531, 1539 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a duty of candor
might chill advocacy); see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990); Oliveri v. Thompson,
803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985), ajrg 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see supra notes 139-40
and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing defendants'
information and resources). See generally Leatherman v. Tan-ant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162-63 (1993) (articulating the Federal Rules' pleading regime).
211. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 874. The revisers of the 1993 Rule meant to
minimize these complications. Id; see also Tobias, Proposed, supra note 1, at 1782.
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contentions with adequate specificity, and how courts would subsequently
judge their assessments of these issues."'
Resolution of these questions will in turn implicate many technical issues.
Numerous controversies will arise which will involve refined questions about
the following issues: how diligently attorneys investigated the facts, how
carefully they employed their predictive powers and drafted factual allegations
on the basis of limited information some years ago, how accurately they can
now reconstruct their earlier activities, and how persuasively they can explain
those efforts. Because these disputes frequently will implicate credibility
determinations, they could necessitate oral proceedings, a number of which
may devolve into swearing matches over what reasonably might have been
foreseen years before. The disposition of these controversies promises to
consume scarce time, money, and energy of judges, parties, and attorneys and
to exacerbate growing incivility among practitioners, while contributing
nothing to, and perhaps actually reducing, resolution of lawsuits based on
their merits.
The intrinsically fact-specific nature of most disputes involving Rule 11 's
factual certification requirements makes it difficult to provide particularized
guidance regarding their implementation. 3 Nonetheless, I afford general
suggestions by employing examples of factual assertions which are based on
information and belief, and by relying substantially on two of the revisers'
expressly enunciated purposes for amendment: (1) accommodating litigants
who might require additional discovery to confirm the allegations or denials
in their papers, and (2) equalizing the responsibilities which Rule 11 places
on plaintiffs and defendants. These explicitly articulated goals, together with
the Rule revisers' use of several important yet open-ended terms, such as
"reasonable" and "likely," evidence the revisers' intent to impose relatively
minimal requirements with which practitioners and parties can rather readily
comply and to encourage courts to enforce the strictures of Rule 1 1 realisti-
cally, flexibly, and leniently.214
An example illustrates these ideas more concretely. Judges who must
ascertain whether plaintiffs specifically identified factual contentions which
were "likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery" should consider "specifically," "likely,"
and "reasonable" as low, easily met standards, treating the efforts of such
plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements of particularity, likelihood, and
212. I mean to emphasize the difficulty of making the assessments at the time lawyers made them
and of reconstructing those thought processes at a later date. The Advisory Committee apparently
intended to retain the admonition of the revisers of the 1983 Rule that judges are not to employ
hindsight in ascertaining whether the Rule was violated. See FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 (1983 revision) advisory
committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 198, 199.
213. I realize that disputes over compliance with the legal certification requirements can also be fact-
specific. See supra notes 166, 181 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text. The propositions regarding parties' satisfaction
and judicial enforcement apply with special force to plaintiffs because the drafters clearly meant to
equalize plaintiffs' and defendants' burdens and because most plaintiffs need more extensive discovery.
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reasonableness in a realistic manner.215 Courts, therefore, might permit
plaintiffs to identify factual allegations with little specificity and allow them
considerable time for investigation and discovery if, before filing, the
plaintiffs lacked access to, or had limited time or money for collecting,
information to substantiate their factual contentions. 2 6
Judges should correspondingly assign great weight to these circumstances,
relating to the availability of relevant information and to plaintiffs' resources,
when gauging the reasonableness of plaintiffs' prefiling factual inquiries. The
example in the preceding paragraph also emphasizes the reasonableness of
prefiling investigations less than the sufficiency of the factual allegations.2 17
Courts should consider both factors to be important and treat them with a
finely calibrated analysis similar to those previously recommended for parsing
papers and for legal theories.218 Indeed, judges may well want to assign
particular significance to prefiling inquiries in the factual certification context,
because the revisers clearly conditioned parties' opportunities to plead on
information and belief on their completion of appropriate prefiling factual
investigations.2 9
By comparison, the revisers' specifically stated goal of equalizing Rule 1 l's
burdens, and their use of the adverb "reasonably" instead of "likely" to
describe a defendant's duty when pleading on information and belief, indicate
that the revisers meant to impose comparatively rigorous requirements on
defendants which would be relatively difficult to meet and intended that
courts enforce the factual certification strictures against defendants rather
technically and strictly.220 Judges should also remember that most defen-
dants can, with comparative ease, specifically identify those denials which
"are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief" because Rule 8(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently permits defendants "without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
215. Judges making the reasonable opportunity determination should draw on the analogous Rule
26(b)(1) inquiry employed in tailoring discovery to the needs of a particular case. See FED. IL CIv. P.
26(b)(1).
216. These examples pertaining to litigants' circumstances obviously are not exhaustive. For instance,
numerous factors relevant to legal theories are similarly applicable to factual contentions. See, e.g., supra
notes 139.40 and accompanying text.
217. The example in the text also emphasizes the factual certification provision of Rule I I which
permits pleading on information and belief, because it was this example which propelled the drafters'
changes in this part of the Rule and will be integral to plaintiffs' compliance. Guidance regarding the
reasonableness of prefiling factual investigations appears in the preceding textual sentence and the
following two textual sentences.
218. See supra notes 160-62, 187-92 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 194-95, 198 and accompanying text. These ideas are reinforced by important
reasons which influenced the revisers' decision to revise the 1983 Rule: to ameliorate the dispropor-
tionate invocation of Rule 11 against plaintiffs and its general overuse. See, e.g., supra notes 75, 87 and
accompanying text. The inclusion of the safe harbor provision attests to these reasons for the revision.
See infra notes 228-29. These ideas also derive support from the revisers' second major goal relating
to factual certification: the accommodation of litigants needing additional discovery, because most
plaintiffs need more discovery. See supra notes 140, 216 and accompanying text.
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averment" to so plead and because defendants typically have greater access
to, and resources for collecting, information involving their denials.22
An example more pointedly illustrates these propositions.222 In determining
whether defendants specifically identified denials which were "reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief," courts should consider "specifi-
cally" and "reasonably" as relatively stringent standards, viewing defendants'
attempts to comply with them in a comparatively strict manner. Judges,
accordingly, might require that defendants identify denials with considerable
particularity and demand much of their representation that those denials were
reasonably premised on a lack of information or belief.223
2. Sanctions
The 1993 amendment to Rule 11 substantially changes the 1983 version's
command that courts impose an appropriate sanction, which might encompass
monetary assessments, including attorney fees, when they ascertain that
attorneys or pro se litigants had contravened Rule 11. Perhaps most significant
was the revisers' determination to leave the decision of whether to sanction
within the trial court's discretion, as it had been before the 1983 amendment.
Moreover, the revisers expressly prescribed numerous specific procedures
which now govern the sanctioning process. The revisers also made several
alterations which were primarily intended to reduce further the probability that
judges will levy pecuniary awards when they determine that Rule 11 has been
violated.
a. Sanctioning Procedures
The new Rule includes numerous particular sanctioning procedures, in sharp
contrast to the 1.983 amendment, which afforded few such procedures. 4
The most important procedures included in the 1993 amendment provide for
221. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b); see also supra note 210 and accompanying text.
222. This example is similar to that provided for plaintiffs. See supra notes 215-16 and accompany-
ing text.
223. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. The ideas pertaining to the rest of the example
relating to plaintiffs, such as those regarding the reasonableness of prefiling inquiries, similarly apply
here, and judges should extrapolate from them. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. Judges,
therefore, should remember that most defendants will have more access to, and resources for collecting,
information relevant to denials. These illustrations obviously are not exhaustive. For instance, additional
quantitative and qualitative factors can be relevant. Four factual assertions that lack substantiation,
therefore, will normally be worse than one, although a single assertion could be violative if it is
material.
It is virtually impossible to afford very detailed guidance that will limit the inconsistent judicial
application and satellite litigation which may inhere in the fact-specific inquiries that Rule I I motions
challenging factual certifications will present. See supra note 211 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 214 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that open-ended terms exacerbate the problem).
However, courts obviously should attempt to implement the Rule with maximum consistency while
treating like situations as similarly as possible.
224. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68; see also INTEIM
REPORT, supra note 61, at 17.
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Rule 11 motions to be filed separately, for parties to receive notice and to
have an opportunity to respond, the requirement of judicial explanations for
sanctioning decisions, the creation of "safe harbors," the allowance ofjudicial
discretion, and provisions which contemplate appellate review.
The 1993 Rule requires counsel as well as unrepresented litigants to submit
sanctions motions independently of other documents that they file and to
describe the specific infraction alleged to violate the Rule. These strictures
are, in part, intended to make the pursuit of sanctions more onerous, thereby
reducing Rule 11 activity.22 5 Courts must also give sanction targets "notice
and a reasonable opportunity to respond" to the moving party's allegations,
and when judges decide to impose sanctions, they must explain their decisions
in written orders or on the record, unless the party sanctioned waives this
right.226 The Advisory Committee Note states that the procedures which
courts provide "will depend on the circumstances"; however, judges should
tailor procedural protections to the perceived severity of the offense and the
potential gravity of the sanction contemplated.227
The new Rule affords a "safe harbor," which allows parties to file Rule 11
motions only twenty-one days after they have served a description of the
purported offense on the alleged violator, giving the alleged violator the
opportunity to amend or withdraw the objectionable paper.228 Should the
safe harbor provision operate in the way that the revisers contemplated, it
might protect resource-deficient litigants or other parties who bring less
traditional, politically charged litigation, or cases which could go either way
under existing law. This might also decrease the Rule's chilling effect.229
Some attorneys, however, may be tempted to employ the safe harbor device
for inappropriate tactical benefits. For instance, counsel could base notice of
potential violations on the refined parsing of a paper or questionable
challenging of a factual contention which might ultimately have evidentiary
support. Service of notice would require that targets unnecessarily expend
substantial resources in order to respond within three weeks. Upon receipt,
targets are given only twenty-one days to conduct a great deal of activity,
such as analyzing the notification afforded, reconsidering the allegedly
offensive behavior or papers, and undertaking greater research.
The provision of a safe harbor may worsen one of the Rule's most
problematic dimensions: the "threat and retreat" aspect, which deflects
attention from the substance of lawsuits to attorneys' abilities, thereby
225. See FED. R. Civ. P. I 1(c)(2)(A), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 423; see also Tobias, Reconsidering,
supra note 1, at 877 (discussing the Advisory Committee's intent to reduce Rule I 1 activity).
226. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3), reprinted in 146 F.t.D. at 423; see also FED. 1. CIV. P. 11
advisory committee's note, at 589 (discussing the issue of waiver).
227. See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 589; Tobias,
Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 877-78 (advocating tailored procedures).
228. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(1)(A), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 422-23.
229. The Advisory Committee substantially relied on the safe harbor provision in responding to
criticisms of Rule 11 and recognized that it might permit parties to conduct less prefiling investigation.
The Committee believed, however, that the benefits of the device outweighed this risk. 1992 Pointer
Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523-24.
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increasing incivility and the quantity of paper produced.23 Courts must be
aware of the likelihood that practitioners will improperly use the safe harbor
provision for strategic gain and should punish those who abuse it.23I
The 1993 Rule commits to the discretion of trial judges the determination
of whether litigants or lawyers have contravened the Rule and, if so, whether
to impose sanctions.232 Appellate courts are to review these decisions for
abuses of discretion pursuant to the standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.233 The Advisory Committee Note
instructs that there would be such abuse when a court premised its "ruling on
an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.
234
This approach leaves district judges with too much discretion while
providing for insufficiently rigorous appellate review. This discretion and the
appellate review standard will inadequately protect civil rights plaintiffs from
trial courts that strenuously enforce the Rule against them. Because such
plaintiffs and others who lack resources or power are risk averse, this
approach makes them vulnerable to chilling. The very deferential appellate
court oversight of district judges' Rule 11 determinations in three controver-
sial civil rights suits resolved during the revision process exemplifies these
difficulties. 2
3
Trial courts, which the new provision vests with broad discretion to declare
violations and levy sanctions, should exercise that discretion very judiciously,
particularly when requested to sanction civil rights plaintiffs or other parties
with few resources. For example, if district judges entertain reasonable doubts
that these litigants have contravened Rule 11, they should be extremely
reluctant to find violations or should at least exercise their discretion in favor
230. I wish to thank John Frank, Esq., Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz., for thesi ideas. See also
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 20-21
(1992) (discussing Rule I and civility).
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.RD. 583, 591 (including
admonitions similar to those in the text). Targets can raise the argument that their opponents have
abused the safe harbor provision by filing motions with the court.
232. See FED. R. Civ. P. I 1(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23.
233. 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 583, 590; see generally supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's literal
interpretation of Rule 11).
234. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 590.
235. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (1 th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992); Blue
v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); In re
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969 (1991). Selection of the abuse of
discretion standard may reflect a balancing of the needs of parties for appellate redecision on the one
hand and judicial economy on the other. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion,
31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982) (suggesting that the "abuse of discretion" standard does not give complete
immunity to trial court rulings and that appellate courts should consider whether the lower courts'
superior opportunities for observation or other reasons of policy require greater deference than
conclusions of law or application of law to fact); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840 (1984)
(identifying the various aspects of procedure, how those aspects influence court decision-making, and
exploring different procedural models, each with varying levels of review on previous decisions).
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of not awarding sanctions.236 Appellate courts should also monitor the
application of Rule 11 by trial judges and reverse overzealous enforcement.
b. Appropriate Sanctions
The revisers had four primary goals in mind when providing judges with
guidance for selecting appropriate sanctions once they have determined that
lawyers or unrepresented parties have contravened Rule 11 and that the
imposition of sanctions is appropriate. The revisers wished to emphasize that
courts might assess nonfinancial awards and that the Rule's principal purpose
is to deter abuse of the litigation process. The revisers also sought to limit the
imposition of pecuniary sanctions, particularly attorney fees, and to discourage
reliance on Rule 11 as a compensatory mechanism.
The revisers' intent finds expression in numerous sources. Indicia of the
Advisory Committee's thinking, for instance, appear in the text of its May,
1991 and April, 1992 drafts; in the proposed Advisory Committee Notes
which attended those documents; in Judge Pointer's May, 1992 letter
submitting the April, 1992 draft to the Standing Committee; and in records of
Committee deliberations. Over the course of the rule revision process, the
revisers' resolve to attain their four goals seemed to intensify, their admoni-
tions to courts applying the new sanctioning guidelines became clearer and
more insistent, and the means which they devised for accomplishing the
objectives gained increasing efficacy. The Standing Committee's controversial
decision to eliminate mandatory sanctioning epitomized these features of the
amendment process.
The Advisory Committee had explicitly expressed its four purposes as early
as 1991. A critical way in which the Committee sought to achieve these goals
was by defining and explicating "appropriate sanction" in the text of the 1991
preliminary draft. The text provided that sanctions "shall be limited to what
is sufficient to deter comparable conduct by persons similarly situated" '237
and elaborated on this definition:
IT]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary
nature, an order to pay a monetary penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs incurred as a direct result of the
violation.238
236. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1, at 885-89 (discussing other factors principally
implicating the imposition of sanctions, which are not sufficiently relevant to the issues treated here to
warrant examination).
237. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 77; 'see also id., at 80 (advisory committee's note) ("In
general, the court should select sanctions that are not more severe than are needed to deter such
improper conduct by similarly situated persons.). The new Rule provides that sanctions "shall be
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated." FED. L CIV. P. 1 l(c)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 422-23.
238. PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 89, at 77. The new Rule retained all of this language while
adding that fee-shifting must be "warranted for effective deterrence." FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 (c)(2), reprinted
in 146 F.R.D. at 422-23; cf. Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note I, at 880-85 (including an additional
examination of ways in which the Advisory Committee sought to attain its four objectives).
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The Advisory Committee Note which accompanied the preliminary draft
explained and expanded upon this textual material by suggesting that a
plethora of potential sanctions are available to judges and by compiling a
comprehensive list of possible sanctions other than attorney fee-shifting to
violators. 239 The Note added that the Committee had not attempted in the
text to enumerate those factors which judges should consider in selecting
appropriate sanctions, "but, for emphasis, it [did] specifically note that a
sanction may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. 24 ° Judge Pointer
correspondingly observed that the Committee agreed "with the premise that
cost-shifting ha[d] created the incentive for many unnecessary Rule 11
motions, ha[d] too frequently been selected as the sanction, and, indeed ha[d]
led to the large awards most often cited by critics of the 1983 rule. ' 24' He
stated that the Committee's response was to include in the proposed text and
accompanying Note "language that, while continuing to permit cost-shifting
awards, explicitly recited the deterrent purpose of Rule 11 sanctions and the
potential for nonmonetary sanctions. 242
The Advisory Committee also exhibited solicitude for the needs of litigants
and lawyers who have little money or power, such as numerous civil rights
plaintiffs and their counsel, by inserting three admonitions in the Advisory
Committee Note. The Committee first suggested that partial fee reimburse-
ment might be an adequate deterrent to Rule 11 violations by individuals with
modest resources. 243 For similar reasons, the revisers also included in the
Note the following factor as one of an enumerated list which courts could
properly consider in choosing appropriate sanctions: "[W]hat amount, given
the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that
person from repetition in the same case. 244 The Note also admonished
judges against relying on Rule 11 for fee-shifting which would contravene the
standards governing statutory fee awards, as required by the Christiansburg
Garment opinion, in litigation pursued under legislation which prescribes fee
awards to prevailing parties.
245
239. These possibilities included "striking the offending paper, issuing an admonition, reprimand,
or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable
to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities, etc." PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89,
at 79 (advisory committee's note).
240. Id. The Advisory Committee Note did include a thorough list of factors. Id. at 80.
241. 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 519, 524. Although the quoted
language in this sentence and the one which follows appears in the May, 1992 letter, Judge Pointer was
alluding to the Committee's action in adopting the May, 1991 preliminary draft.
242. Id.
243. PRELIMINARY DRAF, supra note 89, at 79 (advisory committee's note).
244. Id. at 80.
245. Id., at 79; see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). This reminder
is another strong indicator of the revisers' intent to circumscribe fee-shifting even more. It apparently
limits fee-shifting against plaintiffs who pursue litigation under legislation prescribing fee awards to
Rule violations which could be characterized as vexatious, meritless, or frivolous. See id. at 421; see
also supra notes 175, 179-80 and accompanying text. All three admonitions remain in the note that
accompanies the new Rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
583, 588.
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By the spring of 1992, when the Advisory Committee had reviewed all of
the public comments on its May, 1991 proposal and conconlitantly revised the
preliminary draft, the Committee's resolve to achieve the four goals seemed
even more firm, while it evinced continuing concern for the needs of
resource-poor parties. The Advisory Committee instituted some changes in the
text which elucidated and accentuated its earlier attempts to decrease judicial
reliance on pecuniary sanctions and to restrict Rule I1's invocation for
compensatory purposes by circumscribing courts' discretion to levy monetary
assessments even more than the Committee had in earlier drafts. The
Committee inserted new phraseology into the proposal which prohibits fee-
shifting except when "warranted for effective deterrence."246 The Advisory
Committee Note explains that, because the purpose of sanctions "is to deter
rather than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is
imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.247 The Note
adds that judges ought to consider shifting fees only in "unusual circum-
stances, particularly for [intentional violations, when] deterrence may be
ineffective unless the sanction" requires financial payment to injured
parties. 248 The Advisory Committee, even when clarifying those "unusual
circumstances" in which "effective deterrence" might necessitate fee-shifting,
expressed concern for resource-poor litigants by using them as an example:
"The Advisory Committee remains convinced that there are situations-
particularly when unsupportable contentions are filed to harass or intimidate
an adversary in some cases involving litigants with greatly disparate financial
resources-in which cost-shifting may be needed for effective deter-
rence."
249
The Standing Committee did retain the sanction of attorney fee-shifting and
the concomitant possibility that judges might order Rule 11 violators to make
these payments to adversaries harmed by their violations.25 ° Yet the Com-
mittee reinstituted discretionary sanctioning, thereby authorizing courts not to
impose sanctions at all, even when they determine that lawyers or unrepre-
sented parties have contravened Rule 11. The new Rule and its attendant
Advisory Committee Note should thus dramatically limit the shifting of
attorney fees and ought to restrict significantly financial assessments. The
1993 Rule should correspondingly reduce the incentives for filing sanctions
motions to recoup the costs of litigation which had existed under the 1983
version of Rule 11.251
246. FED. R. CIv. P. I l(c)(2), reprinted in 146 FR.D. at 422-23.
247. FED. R. CIv. P. I I advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 583, 587-88 (emphasis
added).
248. Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
249. See 1992 Pointer Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524.
250. See Memorandum of John Frank, supra note 154.
251. Many observers, including Advisory Committee members, agree that the prospect of recouping
litigation expenses fostered much Rule I I activity under the 1983 version. See, e.g., 1992 Pointer Letter,
supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 524; Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 1015; Vairo, supra note
5, at 234-35.
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A few incentives for invoking the new Rule remain, however. Even parties
with considerably reduced exposure to liability for attorney fees could be
troubled by the possibility of having to pay a penalty into court, as they will
probably be indifferent to the recipient of the money. Moreover, judges can
award reasonable expenses and attorney fees to those parties that prevail on
sanctions motions, which makes the Rule's deployment cost-free. 52 Simply
threatening to file a Rule 11 motion may yield important strategic benefits.
Receiving notice of potential Rule violations could generally disrupt a
sanction target's pursuit of litigation and require that it undertake unproduc-
tive, expensive research within twenty-one days to ascertain the notice's
validity.2"3 These tactical advantages, together with the prospect, albeit
limited, of recovering some compensation as a sanction or for prevailing on
a motion, undoubtedly mean that Rule 11 's invocation will remain appealing
to many lawyers and litigants. Most resource-poor parties will be risk averse
and susceptible to the uses and effects of Rule 11 described above.254
Courts, when exercising their discretion in determining whether to sanction
and, if so, what sanctions to impose, should remember all of the matters
previously discussed, particularly the guidance provided by the rule revisers
for levying appropriate sanctions expressed in the four major objectives as
well as the factors examined above.255 Perhaps most important, especially
to the issues addressed in this Article, judges should closely examine ways of
limiting incentives for employing the 1993 Rule to the maximum extent
possible and of being solicitous of the needs of resource-deficient liti-
gants.256
One critical means of achieving the goal of minimizing the Rule's use
would be for courts to eschew sanctions in all situations involving Rule 11
violations which could be characterized as less than serious. Helpful,
straightforward examples are those types of activities described as insignifi-
cant infractions when parsing papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether
Rule 11 is triggered.25 7 Similarly illustrative are prefiling inquiries that
implicate simple negligence, papers which include one comparatively
unimportant legal contention that is rather frivolous, and papers which include
252. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(c)(l)(A), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-22; see also 1992 Pointer
Letter, supra note 36, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 519, 524-25 (stating that judges need discretion to
"discourage non-meritorious Rule I 1 motions without creating a disincentive to the presentation" of
legitimate motions).
253. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
254. The Advisory Committee foresaw some of these problems and admonished courts to be aware
of them and treat them accordingly. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 89, at 79 (advisory
committee's note); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583,
590-91.
255. See supra notes 235-49 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 1,
at 880-88 (including a thorough treatment of guidance for sanctioning in the context of the 1991
proposal).
256. Of course, judges should achieve these objectives in a manner which is consistent with the
important reasons for the revisers' amendment of Rule 11. These include reducing the Rule's invocation,
deterring frivolous litigation, and retaining the "stop-and-think" duties.
257. See supra notes 151-52, 162 and accompanying text.
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relatively few mistakes in factual allegations which are not material. These
examples are intentionally overdrawn to illustrate phenomena which are
clearly less than serious; judges should treat considerably worse activity as
insufficiently serious to warrant sanctions.
At some point, lawyers' and litigants' violations of the new Rule will be
grave enough that courts should entertain the possibility of sanctions. Because
the determination of whether a violation is severe enough to warrant sanctions
is fact-dependent, it is difficult to provide precise guidance on this issue.
Judges deciding whether Rule violations are sufficiently severe to deserve
some sanction should apply finely calibrated assessments analogous to those
noted above." 8
In determining whether sanctions are warranted, courts should consider
which components of the Rule were contravened, to what extent, and why. For
instance, judges should evaluate the comparative unreasonableness of the
prefiling inquiries and the relative inadequacy of the legal contentions and
factual assertions presented. Courts should also consult quantitative and
qualitative factors. They should ask, for example, how many legal theories
were deficient and how critical those theories were to the paper. Courts should
also ask what number of factual assertions were erroneous and how material
these assertions were. Judges must also determine the reasons for the
violations, considering, for instance, the time and resources available to the
parties for conducting prefiling investigations, researching legal theories,
collecting and analyzing relevant factual material, and drafting papers.
When these assessments indicate that attorneys or parties have seriously
contravened the new Rule, courts should consult numerous factors, most of
which can be derived from the guidance provided by the revisers. Perhaps
most importantly, judges should always tailor the severity of the sanctions
levied to the gravity of the offense, which can be defined more specifically
in terms of the parameters employed in the two preceding paragraphs for
ascertaining seriousness.
Several examples illustrate these ideas. When Rule 11 violations are less
than very serious, courts should carefully explore the broad array of non-
monetary sanctions, possibilities that are limited only by the judiciary's
creativity. 259 Such nonmonetary sanctions are warranted when practitioners'
and parties' offenses barely cross the threshold of seriousness and even when
those violations are considerably more severe. Illustrations include complaints
which include several inadequate legal theories that are not critical or
numerous factual mistakes which are not material. Even if the legal theories
or the factual assertions are more important, they might not deserve monetary
sanctions, if factors such as lack of time, money, or access to relevant
information explain the inadequacies.
258. See, e.g., supra notes 160-62, 191-93 and accompanying text. Such assessments find justification
in the eight factors that the Advisory Committee Note enumerates, and several are employed below. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 146 F.R.D. 583, 587; see also supra notes 244-45 and
accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, courts should consider the prospect of imposing monetary
sanctions only when counsel or parties contravene Rule 11 in a very serious
manner. This encompasses conduct that could be described as egregious
misbehavior or severe litigation abuse. More specific examples include the
failure to perform any prefiling inquiry whatsoever, the submission of papers
which include multiple legal theories that could be characterized as highly
frivolous, or the submission of papers which proffer a number of material
factual assertions that totally lack evidentiary support. Even in such
circumstances, judges should remember the revisers' advice, particularly their
admonition that fee-shifting awards be restricted to situations in which they
are warranted for effective deterrence.260
Judges should apply several special factors in addition to those discussed
above when resource-poor litigants are found to be in violation of the new
Rule. Courts should obviously consult the revisers' guidance which specifi-
cally relates to these parties. Most importantly, courts must follow the
Advisory Committee Note's express warning against fee-shifting that conflicts
with statutory prescriptions in special categories of cases, particularly civil
rights actions.2 6' Judges should also seriously consider the litigants' finan-
cial circumstances, such as their ability to pay.262 Moreover, judges should
keep in mind that resource-poor litigants' lack of money, time, and power
makes them risk averse and susceptible to being chilled by the imposition of
any monetary sanction, but especially by fee-shifting.263 Courts, therefore,
should entertain the possibility of ordering Rule 11 violators to pay fees only
in the most extreme cases-essentially when no other reasonable alternative
is available. An illustration might be a heinous Rule 11 violation for which
the offender expresses no remorse and which causes an opponent to incur
enormous expense.26
CONCLUSION
The 1993 revision of Rule 11 substantially improves upon the 1983 version,
which proved to be highly controversial and very difficult to implement. If
federal judges apply the new Rule as suggested in this Article, they can
remedy or ameliorate the most significant problems that the 1983 amendment
posed. Moreover, if attorneys and parties follow the recommendations, they
260. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
262. The Advisory Committee Note expressly states that judges should treat this factor as a "proper
consideration." See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 146 F.R.D. 583, 587. Many courts
made this consideration relevant under the 1983 Rule. See, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524-25
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969 (1991); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-
85 (10th Cir. 1990).
263. Courts should vigilantly police the Rule's invocation for tactical advantage and punish such
activity whenever they detect it. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
264. Although remorse might seem more relevant to criminal law sentencing, it implicates effective
deterrence and deterring frivolous litigation. The Advisory Committee Note also intimates that similar
behavior can be relevant. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 146 F.R.D. 583, 587.
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should find it easy to satisfy the 1993 Rule requirements. Such judicial
enforcement and implementation, together with lawyer and litigant compli-
ance, may reduce the invocation of Rule 11, satellite litigation, and the Rule's
chilling effects and thereby meet the revisers' goals.

